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 The complexity of globalization and how it impacts U.S. national security combined 
with the political need to create policies easy for the general public to understand have 
caused U.S. politicians to rely heavily on sanctions and the military as instruments of foreign 
policy. This thesis discusses the negative impacts of these policies, and presents alternatives, 
using case studies of post-World War II Germany and Japan, post-2003 invasion Iraq, the 
development of South Korea, and the emergence of China. It applies the lessons learned to 
Iran and North Korea in an effort to identify a more moderate path to liberal democracy for 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
It is time to change U.S. policy towards Iran and North Korea into one that actively 
seeks to change both rogue states into modern allies of the global community. The United 
States has followed the Cold War era policy of containment through sanctions and military 
posturing for dealing with North Korea and Iran for decades. Containment policies against 
these rogue states have prolonged human suffering and allowed each country to continually 
threaten regional security. An overemphasis on spreading democracy, with inadequate 
attention paid to building the foundations for liberalism, have led to the rising numbers of 
illiberal democracies throughout the world and generated a global security crisis of human 
rights abuses. Foreign policy analyst Fareed Zakaria elaborates the key difference between 
liberal and illiberal democracies:  “[F]or almost a century in the West, democracy has meant 
liberal democracy--a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by 
the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of the basic liberties of speech, 
assembly, religion, and property. In fact, this latter bundle of freedoms--what might be 
termed constitutional liberalism--is theoretically different and historically distinct from 
democracy.”
1 Building the foundations for constitutional liberalism through continuous 
engagement will improve national security much more effectively than broad sanctions or 
military operations. Democracy without security and a stable foundation will fail.  
The United States, as the world’s most powerful economy and military, has assumed 
a lead role in the imposition of sanctions and military actions against other states. Author 
James Dobbins states:  “Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has felt free to 
intervene not simply to police cease-fires or restore the status quo but to try to bring about 




transforming those of Germany and Japan four decades earlier.”
2
 The United States has 
adhered to a containment strategy against Iran and North Korea in-spite of its efforts to 
promote democracy and trade elsewhere. Sanctions against Iraq, Iran, and North Korea have, 
to date, failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and failed to prevent Iran from 
conducting proxy wars in the Middle East.  
Broad sanctions and military force are the United States’ primary tools of 
international coercion. Sanctions are supposed to be the peaceful alternative to military force. 
Researchers Fred Hansen and Axel Borchgrevink determine that “sanctions can be military, 
cultural, political or economic, depending on the tools available and the aims and purposes of 
the sanction.”
3
 Military force is, on the other hand, costly and focuses on breaking down 
power and institutions rather than building the foundations for a liberal society. Both options, 
however, satisfy the short-term goals of domestic politics by displaying decisive actions 
against the undesirable behavior of foreign actors. Both options have proven to be ineffective 
at achieving the development of liberal democracy, and have often created greater problems 
for the targeted populations and the international community.  
Broad sanctions are supposed to reduce the means of control an offending regime can 
use against its population, and create the opportunity for a popular overthrow from the inside. 
Instead, research indicates they increase the ruling regime’s control over the population by 
generating scarcity that creates greater dependence. Sanctions also generate a rich 
environment for crime and corruption that threatens to spill over into neighboring countries 
and destabilize entire regions. A study by Daniel Drezner showed that sanctions increase 
criminal activity:  “By punishing ordinary market activity, sanctions give entrepreneurs a 






 Economic sanctions encourage illicit activity by punishing the legitimate 
economy and constrain legitimate development that could form the basis for a liberal 
democracy.  
Military intervention, on the contrary, is an expedient way to overthrow a regime, but 
the costs are high in blood and treasure and the aftermath results in a power vacuum if there 
is no bureaucracy to maintain basic state functions. Power vacuums have proven to be hot 
spots for illicit activity and terrorism. Efforts by the international community to fill these 
vacuums have proven ineffective in many cases. One of the worst, and most recent, cases of 
a disastrous power vacuum was the one that occurred in Iraq after the 2003 ousting of 
Saddam Hussein by the U.S. military. United States Army Colonel James R. Hoy, Jr. wrote 
that: “The Bush administration's decision to pursue a policy of regime change led to 
discussions on how to conduct the post-war occupation and reconstruction efforts. Some 
believed that military success would provide the opportunity to export democratic ideals to 
the troubled Middle East.”
5
 The complete dismantling of the government, or De-
Ba’athification in Iraq, failed because the nation’s bureaucracies were removed from power, 
leaving it in a state of chaos for which the United States was not prepared. Post-war Iraq was 
an extreme case but serves as an excellent example of why we need a better strategy for 
preparing underdeveloped rogue states for modernization, stability, and integration into 
global society.  
Democracy alone is not the key to stability and security. Fareed Zakaria warns of the 
dangers of overemphasizing democracy alone: “Democracy without constitutional liberalism 
is not simply inadequate, but dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of 
power, ethnic divisions, and even war.”
6




democracies. These conditions can be preemptively reduced through the cultivation of stable 
state bureaucracies that can be used to implement and facilitate the development of 
foundational institutions for liberal democracy. Many countries lack stability and the 
requisite foundational institutions for building liberal democracies which limits the 
effectiveness of state building efforts. There have been repeated instances of oppressed 
people overthrowing their governments, followed by vocal support for democratic reform 
from the international community, only to slide back into either some level of anarchy or the 
rise of a new dictator as in many Mid-Eastern states following the Arab Spring in 2011.  
A more effective strategy would be to prepare a population for liberal democracy and 
a globally integrated economy by continually engaging it through various means and 
channels that build foundational institutions. Doing so may reduce the risk or impacts of 
sudden shocks. Jonathan Monten identifies the core risk of introducing elections into a 
recently unstable state too early. “Introducing democratic elections before the development 
of strong public institutions can also raise the risk of instability and violence.”
7
 The sudden 
shock of regime change forced upon an unprepared population will result in a return to the 
familiar, in most cases one dictator is simply replaced by another. Societies need to develop 
the foundational institutions necessary for successful democracy founded on constitutional 
liberalism and free trade. Other institutions such as free press and a liberal education system 
also act as the pillars of a democratic society. Eva Bellin states:  “Political institutions don't 
have to be of indigenous origin to be acceptable. So long as the innovations are perceived as 
serving key interests and don't come at the expense of national identity, then institutions of 
foreign derivation might be expected to survive.”
8
 Building such institutions requires the 




and established bureaucracies to disseminate and execute strategies for development. These 
groups have the influence and technical expertise to accomplish such ambitious national 
transformations. These were major components of the successful reconstruction of Germany 
and Japan following World War II. 
Populations need to be prepared for liberalization, democracy, and economic 
integration through sustained engagement. Isolation from the international community 
contributes to state decay. The case study of Iraq after the 2003 invasion highlights the 
importance of institution building. Eva Bellin determined that several conditions existed in 
post-war Germany and Japan that were not present in Iraq: “The successful creation of stable 
democracies in Germany and Japan was facilitated by their endowment with relatively 
developed economies, ethnic homogeneity, strong state institutions, and historical experience 
with democracy, as well as context-specific factors such as the experience of devastating 
defeat, the fear of Communist threat, and the dictatorial freedom of occupation bestowed by 
contemporary cultural norms.”
9
 Change for both countries was facilitated by a list of unique 
scenarios not likely to be repeated in the modern world. Therefore continuous engagement 
with states is a better strategy for spreading democracy, maintaining stability, and improving 
U.S. national security in the modern world by reducing the impacts of sudden shocks to the 
international system. Doing so can build and strengthen the requisite public institutions for 
successful democracy and peaceful relations. Keeping isolated populations engaged in the 
international community is a better way to prepare them for full participation once their 
isolating and rogue regimes have fallen. As Fareed Zakaria stated: “Economic, civil, and 
religious liberties are at the core of human autonomy and dignity.”
10
 Cultivating such 




This paper will explore the impacts of both sanctions and military force on states 
identified by former President George W. Bush as members of the ‘Axis of Evil’, as well as 
some examples of authoritarian states that have been liberalized over time. It will explore 
alternatives to sanctions and military intervention and offer some recommendations as to how 
they can fulfil domestic political needs while accomplishing the grand strategy of security 
and stability. 
Research Design 
This paper evaluates the lessons learned from past state-building efforts to identify 
effective strategies that can be applied to current and future efforts. It discusses the United 
States’ failures in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. The three case studies are compared to the 
successful democratic transformations of Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The rapid 
development of China over the past forty years is included as a case study due to the success 
of trade relations with the United States and the impact it has had on regional security. Korea 
studies expert Eun Mee Kim explains the difficulties facing developmental states. “The 
paradox of South Korea's remarkable success in development was that it forced the state to 
reevaluate its raison d'être and to curtail its functions. The weakening developmental state is 
presented with unusual challenges when a more dramatic breakdown of the authoritarian 
regime and ensuing democratic consolidation occur.”
11
 The end of the paper briefly discusses 
the People’s Republic of China, its modernization, its trade partnership with the United 
States, and what that means for the historical ideological differences. It uses the lessons 
learned from the failures in Iraq and the successes of Japan, Germany, South Korea, and 
China to determine the best courses of action for overcoming threats and normalizing 




and the slow liberalization of China act as models for modern developing states. University 
of Nottingham Professor Hongyi Lai discusses China’s development, along with its growing 
pains: “From the 1960s to the late 1970s China pursued self-reliance and isolated itself from 
the market-oriented world economy. Between 1955 and 1978, China was almost completely 
free of foreign direct investment (FDI).”
12
 The case studies provide insight into alternate 
ways of overcoming foreign policies that maintain the status quo and prolong human 
suffering. I drew upon existing research to provide insight and perspectives into lessons 
learned from all cases. The goal is to find a way to eliminate the rogue behavior of Iran and 
North Korea without the major shocks to international order caused by sudden collapse.  
 Chapter II discusses why America needs to democratize the world. It clarifies the 
democratic peace theory and how it has formed the foundation of United States foreign 
policy. Democratic Peace Theory expert Bruce Russett provides a strong summary of the 
theory:  “Fellow democracies are likely to provide larger and more reliable markets, to be 
more politically stable and less likely to fight their democratic neighbors, and to avoid human 
rights abuses and civil wars with consequent cross-border spillovers of refugees. Democratic 
neighbors are also more apt to form a mutual protection society against unconstitutional 
usurpation of powers at home, as well as join in collective security endeavors against 
common external foes.”
13
 I then discuss how it has shaped U.S. foreign policy goals and why 
it is important to overcome the threats caused by rogue states.  
Chapter III defines rogue states and discusses the origins of the Axis of Evil. Rogue 
state politics have influenced policy towards those states stricken with the label. States 
labeled as rogues tend to get ostracized from the international community and are frequently 




rogue state label farther in 2002 when he labeled Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an “axis of 
evil.” The section goes on to discuss the ‘Axis of Evil’ identified by former president George 
W. Bush, how that impacted American perceptions of each state, and how that has influenced 
relations. Each will be discussed in greater length in later chapters.  
Chapter IV delves into the use of sanctions as a favorite ‘peaceful’ way of punishing 
transgressors. An article by Dursun Peksen and A. Cooper Drury, covering the negative 
impacts of economic sanctions on potential democracy, identifies the corrosive effects of 
sanctions: “Economic sanctions inadvertently help the targeted regime consolidate 
authoritarian power by enabling elites to enhance their ties with the key political supporters, 
while at the same time economically disrupting its opposition groups (e.g., an opposition 
party or an anti-regime social or political movement) to sustain their political relevance.”
14
 It 
uses the persistence of the regimes in North Korea and Iran as examples of how sanctions 
have failed to improve national security. They do little more than satisfy short-sighted 
domestic political goals and in many cases harm the people they are supposed to help. A 
brief example of how the United Stated used targeted sanctions against Banco Delta Asia to 
bring North Korean leaders to the bargaining table demonstrates a successful usage of 
sanctions to achieve a goal. A government study highlighted the effectiveness and limitations 
of the targeted sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK): “North 
Korea, already one of the poorest and most isolated countries in the world, was brought back 
to the six-sided table at least in part due to the pressure exerted by the Treasury’s actions 
against Banco Delta Asia, a small bank in Macao that had been accused of money laundering 
activity, including moving counterfeit U.S. dollars for the regime.”
15
 Unfortunately that was 




North Korean regime. The purpose of this case study is to show that targeted sanctions can 
be an important policy tool for achieving limited objectives when used in conjunction with 
grand strategies, however, they are ineffective when used as a means of regime change over a 
long period of time. 
Chapter V discusses the difficulties associated with military interventions. The 
drawbacks of which are the high cost in blood and treasure and a negative response from 
afflicted populations and the international community. Military interventions can create 
sudden shocks to international order, create power vacuums, and create general instability in 
the international system. The levels of resources applied to Germany and Japan after World 
War II do not necessarily apply to modern efforts as Christopher Coyne states in his book on 
the effectiveness of military intervention. “The same level of resources –monetary aid, 
troops, organization of elections, and so on—as was invested in West Germany and Japan in 
1945 will generate a drastically different outcome in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2005.”
16
 
Military intervention may be an expedient solution to immediate threats, but they can also 
create greater problems. This chapter discusses post-2003 Iraq and the importance of using 
existing state structures to maintain stability and facilitate change. The de-Baathification 
policy in Iraq created a state of anarchy for which the United States had not planned. A study 
by Colonel James R. Hoy concluded that:  “The whole-scale firing of hundreds of thousands 
of government workers had an enormous impact on security and economic recovery in a 
country with 50% unemployment.”
17
 De-Baathification was built on the belief that all 
Saddam loyalists would be toxic to the country and lead it back into a dictatorship. There was 
an unrealistic expectation that the citizens of Iraq would join together and build a democracy 




to survive against the Islamic State’s regional ambitions. The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq 
serves as an example of what can happen in an extreme case in the wake of military 
intervention. Any usage of military interventions comes attached with political backlash and 
unforeseeable expenses and consequences. Preemptive and preventive military actions have 
become staples in U.S. political repertoire over the past two decades. History has proven, 
however, that military miscalculations can harm the very existence of a state itself. Bruce 
Bechtol takes the consequences of preemptive strikes against North Korea to their logical 
maximum in his book on the threats of North Korea when he states:  “Thus, in any planning 
for a preemptive strike, the assumption that it would start a full-scale war should be an 
integral part of the process.”
18
 The military is not designed to build institutions in foreign 
countries. Therefore, any planning for stability operations, state building, and regime changes 
should take a more proactive approach that focuses on institution building and the formation 
of mutually beneficial partnerships over a longer period of time and well in advance of a 
state-failure. 
Chapter VI is split into two sections covering the post-World War Two democratic 
transitions of Germany and Japan. Each case is unique in its circumstances but the 
motivation was essentially the same. The United States needed to rebuild each country into a 
strong democracy, with capitalist economies to prevent the spread of communism or the rise 
of another dictator. It also needed to develop the internal structures of both to support 
democracy and prevent the sort of singular national thought and control that led to the war. 
Both cases succeeded in spite of their differing circumstances. Eva Bellin singles out the key 
component of success for state building efforts in Germany and Japan: “Both Germany and 




institutions intact. Both possessed an effective police force, judiciary, and civil service with 
which to govern.”
19
 Their success has influenced the reasoning of many political planners 
who expect efforts to rebuild failed states or collapsed regimes will result in the creation of 
stable and modern states. Jonathan Monten singles out the key difference that created 
drastically different outcomes in Japan and Iraq. “The U.S. approach to state-building in Iraq 
differed dramatically from Japan. In the case of Iraq, the United States failed to preserve the 
existing capacity of Iraqi state institutions, and faced substantial barriers to rebuilding those 
state institutions that had eroded or collapsed as a result of the war and ensuing insurgency 
conflict.”
20
 Developing the foundations for stable societies integrated into the international 
community will give them a chance to become allies in spite of what adversities lie ahead..  
Chapter VII draws upon past experience to identify the pillars that form the 
foundations of a successful democracy. Each country used in the previous case studies has 
adapted its traditional culture to modern ways of life, and each has developed at different 
paces and from different foundations. As Fareed Zakaria stated: “The process of genuine 
liberalization and democratization is gradual and long-term, in which an election is only one 
step.”
21
 Analysis of each case study shows that tapping the most stable institutions in a 
developing state can drastically improve national support for liberalizing programs and 
democratic development. The building of the Republic of Korea’s army using officers trained 
by the Japanese military is an example of what would have been a better policy in Iraq, 
especially since many dismissed Iraqi officers formed the Islamic State. Historian Gregg 
Brazinsky highlights this point in his book on the transformation of South Korea into a 
modern democracy. “A handful of Koreans who were able to attend the Japanese Military 




formation and development of the ROK army.”
22
 Many German troops were used in a similar 
way to secure Germany after the fall of the Nazis. In contrast, Iraq was left without 
experienced leaders capable of fighting off al-Qaeda cells and the rise of the Islamic State.  
The biggest fear of those running a country is that they will lose their elite status and support 
for their lifestyle. Eva Bellin identifies the importance of elite buy in: “The commitment of 
elites is central to successful democratization.”
23
 Supporting elites, however, has backfired 
on the United States in the past. Strategies for dealing with either Iran or North Korea need to 
be comprehensive and adhered to until success is achieved. A leading academic on the 
subject of Korea and state development, Eun Mee Kim explains the obstacles of state 
transition faced by South Korea: “The comprehensive developmental state requires, from the 
beginning, a high degree of autonomy from dominant social classes and groups, and a state 
bureaucracy that efficiently and effectively implements policies. Not many Third World 
nations have these conditions.”
24
 Current strategies of the United States tend to vacillate 
between punishing and rewarding, a process that rogue regimes have masterfully 
manipulated to their own advantage. A consistent strategy of foundational institution building 
with emphasis on stability throughout a gradual transition towards constitutional liberalism, 
free trade, and democracy should improve the chances of breaking the status quo and 
transitioning these states into functional members of the international community.  
Chapter VIII briefly discusses some of the domestic political obstacles that need to be 
overcome. A compilation of articles edited as a book by Historian Frank Jacob summarizes 
the dilemma facing United States foreign policy formulation. Politicians build their careers 
on satisfying the demands of their constituents, a process that has led to many short-sighted 




effective state building and the foundations for liberal democracy and national security. Eva 
Bellin highlights the key components of such efforts: “One of the most robust findings of 
twenty-five years of political science rumination on democratization is that durable 
democracy is strongly correlated with economic development.”
25
 Rogue states have 
supported terrorism and America’s enemies, and are potential flashpoints that could lead to 
regional conflicts. They create instability in the international environment that creates human 
suffering and threatens the stability of neighboring states. Applying the lessons of state 
building towards converting Iran and North Korea into stable and relatively liberal states 
would greatly reduce terrorism and nuclear proliferation as well as reverse sources of 
bellicosity and regional instability.  
Summary 
The greatest threat to the United States and the international community is the 
instability of other states. President Barrack Obama described the current national security 
environment in his 2010 national security strategy: “Wars over ideology have given way to 
wars over religious, ethnic, and tribal identity; nuclear dangers have proliferated; inequality 
and economic instability have intensified; damage to our environment, food insecurity, and 
dangers to public health are increasingly shared; and the same tools that empower individuals 
to build enable them to destroy.”
26
 There are rogues in the international community who have 
defied pressures to cease their pursuit of WMDs, improve their treatment of their 
populations, and cease their support for terrorism. Iran and North Korea use their defiance of 
the United States and international norms as a tool to justify their repressive internal 




military threats. Political Scientist Elizabeth Saunders defines the history, usage, and 
meaning of rogue state:   
“In the 1990s, the term ‘rogue state’ became fashionable in US foreign policy 
discourse. The United States government bestowed the ‘rogue state’ label on 
countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea. The most 
commonly invoked criteria for ‘rogue’ status were state support for terrorism 
and the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, 
many traditional US allies, especially members of the European Union, 
consistently rejected the ‘rogue state’ label and stronger incarnations such as 
the ‘axis of evil.’”
27
 
This research attempts to address how to overcome rogue regimes and bring them into 
compliance with international norms. Both Iran and North Korea have internal political, 
social, and economic infrastructures that are critical to facilitating any changes.  
Two key lessons from the occupation of Iraq are that the state bureaucracies should 
be left in place, and that democracy requires certain developed institutions before it can take 
root. In times of uncertainty people tend to revert to the familiar. Middle East studies 
specialist Andrew Flibbert attributed U.S. failure in Iraq to its removal of preexisting Iraqi 
state institutions. “The United States had trouble restoring security and stability because it 
had precipitated the virtual collapse of the Iraqi state by undermining its coercive, 
administrative, legal, and extractive institutions.”
28
 The United States should begin preparing 
Iran and North Korea for liberalism, trade, democracy, and inclusion in the international 
community by finding ways to engage their populations in ways that influence them towards 
becoming more modern states, ease the shock of regime change and avoid the backlash of 
military actions. An article edited by Alexander Lennon puts it into perspective: “Even in 
cases where regime change might be justified--and international consensus on this exists--
war is acceptable only when waged in legitimate self-defense or as the collective decision of 
the United Nations Security Council.”
29




reconciliation for the two Koreas and the theocratic fanaticism in Iran. Engagement requires 
a degree of compromise and acceptance of rogue regimes that could create political recourse 
within the U.S. domestic political arena. Building economic infrastructure, social institutions 
such as free press and school systems, and exposing the population to the international 
community will help liberalize these states and prepare them for democracy. In the case of 
North Korea, South Korea would undoubtedly inherit a derelict state that is not prepared for 
full integration and reconciliation. Inheritance of a derelict North would have lasting negative 
impacts on the South. Author Alexander Lennon describes United States policy towards 
North Korea: “U.S. policy toward North Korea in the last decade has been, for the most part, 
narrow and tactical, focusing on the crisis du jour rather than on a broader game plan.”
30
 A 
more developed North Korea could be brought more into line with South Korea and the 
reconciliation process would be smoother and more gradual. That strategy would more likely 
be agreeable to the Chinese who also have a large stake in the future of North Korea and 
regional stability.  
Iran has many existing state institutions that could liberalize the country once the 
Ayatollah’s parallel political institutions have been removed. Iran’s unique political situation 
is described well by foreign policy expert Behzad Tabatabaei:  “In a theocracy the will of the 
people is subject to the will of God. A religious government or theocratic rule does not derive 
its authority from the people unlike a republic. The proper description of Iran’s political 
system is a totalitarian regime that is a theocratic dictatorship.”
31
 The future scenario for 
freedom and democracy in Iran would require some form of reconciliation between the 
common people, the ruling elites and hardliners. Major offenders can be brought to justice 




potentially be turned from state sponsor of terror to regional stabilizer. It can be converted 
from example of authoritarian theocracy to liberal democracy because it already has a multi 
ethnic population with a history of democracy and established state bureaucracies.  
My recommendation is to proactively develop the state institutions that will allow it 
to change, rather than wait for an internal collapse before trying to implement a new regime. 
The critical first step is to begin engaging economically. Democracy alone is not the key to 
global security. This point is highlighted by Fareed Zakaria:  “Far from being a temporary or 
transitional stage, it appears that many countries are settling into a form of government that 
mixes a substantial degree of democracy with a substantial degree of illiberalism.”
32
 There 
may be times when the offending regime cannot be completely isolated from economic 
development efforts. In such instances we must look to the future potential of the country and 
weigh the pros and cons. Bruce Russet provides insight into improving state building and 
regime change: “The better alternative to regime change by force is democracy by example 
and peaceful incentives. The United States did play a major role in persuading dictators in 
South Korea and the Philippines to surrender power, and European states, acting individually 
and especially through regional international organizations, provided similar assistance in 
Eastern Europe and states of the former Soviet Union.”
33
 Governments and 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) can coordinate efforts for social welfare and 
development programs to begin building institutions that will become the foundations for a 
future democratic society by building liberal social and economic institutions. Finally, the 
threats of military force and sanctions should be used conservatively as they can easily be 
used to frame the United States as an enemy of the people which strengthens the offending 




specifically: “As intended, the imposition of sanctions makes a previously reluctant citizenry 
more inclined to revolt. Thus, to prevent an immediate ouster, the elite has to increase the 
cost of a revolt — and it can do so by reducing the supply of public goods. A lower supply 
means lower incomes for the citizenry and hence more strain (i.e., a steeper fall in utility) 
associated with a revolt's destructive effects.”
34 The ultimate goal is international peace, 
stability, and respect for human rights and freedom from oppression. There will always be 
those who seek otherwise, therefore a stronger international community built on liberalism 
will be more able to provide each other with security from such oppressors as well as 
maintain the stability that is essential to security. United States national security and 
international security cannot be separated in the modern globalized world 
Literature Review 
Title: Peksen, Dursun, and A. Cooper Drury. "Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact 
of Economic Sanctions on Democracy." 
Subject: The Impact of Sanctions 
The authors use time-series cross-national data (1972-2000) to identify sanctions as having a 
negative impact on democracy rather than influencing reforms as intended. They go further 
to suggest that broad sanctions actually increase oppression because the ruling elite must cut 
off resources to their opposition and the regime must increase ties with the ruling elite. 
Ultimately the ruling regime finds a way to maintain its wealth and status, if not increase it, 
while passing the impacts of the sanctions on to the populations they are designed to help.  
 




Subject: How dictators assert power 
This book explores how dictators use violence to build and secure their power base. Of 
particular note is how the Kim regime in North Korea has masterfully engineered a 
nationwide network of violence and suspicion to keep itself in power. The fear and 
intimidation factor that these regimes create among their own people should not be 
underestimated. It creates a tricky moral predicament where the ruling elite are the source of 
stability, yet must be punished for their crimes against humanity. 
 
Title: Dobbins, James. America's Role In Nation-Building: From Germany To Iraq. 
Subject: Nation Building 
The book draws upon lessons learned from nation building efforts in Germany, Japan, 
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan and compiles a list of conclusions 
regarding nation building. Essentially time and effort put into building a state determine the 
net result. One of the lessons learned is that it is much easier to rebuild a nation with a history 
of governance by using its existing institutions. That means there is some hope for states such 
as Iran and North Korea due to their established bureaucracies and political systems which 
can be used to implement policies and maintain continuity of basic state functions. 
 
Title: Drezner, Daniel W. "Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and 
Practice." 
Subject: Targeted Sanctions 
Targeted sanctions have gained favor as a more humanitarian alternative to broad sanctions, 




sanctions targeted directly at offenders have become a favored instrument of international 
pressure by members of the United Nations. They limit the collateral damage that broad 
sanctions such as trade embargoes have on the afflicted populations. However, their success 
does not rate any higher, and may be lower, than that of broad sanctions. They can still be an 
effective tool that should be included in the repertoire of policies at the disposal of the 
international community used in conjunction with other strategies and tactics.  
 
Title: Eun Mee, Kim. "Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental State: With 
Illustrations from the South Korean Case." 
Subject: State Building in South Korea 
This paper identifies the challenges faced by a state during a transition from authoritarianism 
to democracy. “Examination of the South Korean case helped identify and explain the roles 
of three main actors in development: the state, capitalists, and labor.”
35
 The developmental 
authoritarian regime in South Korea had a stake in keeping labor costs low in order to make 
themselves economically competitive. Labor unions worked to overcome severe political 
repression and built some of the foundations for democracy as they organized to improve 
wages and working conditions. There are important foundational institutions to develop as 
precursors to democracy.  
 
Title: Lai, Hongyi. "Uneven Opening of China's Society, Economy, and Politics: Pro-Growth 
Authoritarian Governance and Protests in China.” 




The author identifies the success of China’s open economy along with the shortfalls of its 
closed government. “Negative by-products of pro-growth authoritarianism include weak rule 
of law, official corruption, violation of people’s rights, and few channels for public inputs in 
policy and public grievances. These defects in Chinese governance help to account for 
outbursts of frequent protests during the period of high economic growth.”
36
 Economic 
liberalization has given people a greater stake in their own governance which has increased 
pressure on the government to more effectively respond to the people’s demands. China is 
well on the path to modernization which may ultimately lead it into democracy.  
 
Title: Bechtol, Bruce E. Jr., The Last Days of Kim Jong-il: The North Korean Threat in a 
Changing Era 
Subject: North Korea 
This book assess the many threats of North Korea as a rogue state in flux after the death of its 
well positioned leader Kim Jong-Il and his succession by his less prepared son Kim Jong-Un. 
North Korea is a greater threat than ever due to its advanced nuclear weapons development 
and its new leader’s need to consolidate power. “Because Kim Chong-un is so young and 
because the succession process was rushed following his father’s stroke, he almost 
undoubtedly did not hold the same power in the beginning of 2012 that his father had when 
he assumed the leadership role in 1994.”
37
 North Korea presents many challenges for the 
United States. They are proliferators of both WMDs and terrorism, and engage in many illicit 
activities. They could drag the United States into a prolonged and much larger conflict as 





Title: Tabatabaei, Behzad. "The Political Economy of Oil, Terrorism and Institutional 
Development in Iran and its Impact on the Middle East." 
Subject: Iran’s dual bureaucracies 
The author goes into great detail about the internal workings of the Iranian government and 
the dual structure set up by Khomeini to control the state. “The redundant framework of dual 
institutions creates rent-seeking, corruption, misallocation of scarce resources, an ineffective 
massive governmental bureaucracy, central planning, capital flight and a general state of 
insecurity.”
38
 Reform within the religious bureaucracy is not possible without compromising 
revolutionary ideals, making it unlikely. Iran is not positioned to adapt to rapid economic 
growth or the changing demands of Iranian society due to its gridlocked government 
institutions.  
 
Title: Flibbert, Andrew. "The Consequences of Forced State Failure in Iraq." 
Subject: State Building Failure in Iraq 
The article attributes the state building failure in Iraq on the United States’ decision to 
completely dismantle the Iraqi government. The United States dismantled the Iraqi 
bureaucracy and its military, leaving the most competent members of state administration 
alienated and unemployed. This led directly to the violent insurgency that plagued and 
prolonged the occupation and has left Iraq in its current weakened condition. Iraq was left 
without the basic mechanisms of government which could have been tapped to maintain 
order and basic state functions to keep society together. They would also have been of great 





Title: Monten, Jonathan. "Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan." 
Subject: Post conflict state building 
This article identifies the successes and failures of U.S. postwar state building efforts by 
comparing three case studies and identifying the different factors such as the ideologies of 
the U.S. politicians responsible for planning, levels of funding, preexisting levels of state 
development, and whether or not the bureaucracies were left intact. It identifies the successes 
of Japan’s postwar reconstruction and compares it to the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
While there are many fundamental differences between Japan in the 1940s, Iraq in 2003, and 
Afghanistan in 2001, the lesson is that the key to effective state building is to use the existing 
bureaucracy to administer the development plans. The author identifies the fundamental 
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Chapter II: Why The United States Needs To Democratize The World 
Democratic Peace Theory 
An important question to ask is: Why does the United States need to democratize the 
world? There are certainly plenty of reasons such as trade security, resource access, and the 
improvement of human rights, but how do they relate to the continued existence of the 
United States? The current existential threat to Americans is non-liberal democratic states 
and non-state groups desiring to establish their own state (e.g. the Islamic State-ISIS), 
especially those threatened by the American way of life. Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) 
has been a major influence on U.S. foreign policy since the union was first formed. The 
premise is fairly simple and is well defined by DPT expert Bruce Russett: “Fellow 
democracies are likely to provide larger and more reliable markets, to be more politically 
stable and less likely to fight their democratic neighbors, and to avoid human rights abuses 
and civil wars with consequent cross-border spillovers of refugees. Democratic neighbors are 
also more apt to form a mutual protection society against unconstitutional usurpation of 
powers at home, as well as join in collective security endeavors against common external 
foes.”
1
 There is strength in numbers and security in familiarity. There has also been a 
paradigm shift in the source of legitimacy according to influential political scientist Francis 
Fukuyama: “While there have historically been many forms of legitimacy, in today’s world 
the only serious source of legitimacy is democracy.”
2
 The United States has specialized in 
bringing down autocratic states from its birth, having taken on the British monarch to the 
Soviet Premiers and emerged victorious. Democracy appeals to the common people, which 
threatens elites across the world. It has proven difficult to overthrow once it has taken root in 




power shared by many, and the institutions needed to uphold it make it robust. Stability is 
good for development. Democratic states, though the path may be difficult, have achieved a 
higher level of development over the long run. Development leads to improved human rights, 
increased wealth through better trade, improved living standards, and a reciprocal stake in 
global stability. Authors Derek Reveron and Kathleen Mahoney single out the changing 
threat to U.S. security: “Whereas in the past authoritarian and expansionist regimes were 
usually considered the greatest threats to human security, today it is weak, poor, undeveloped 
states.”
3
 The United States needs more democracies in the world because they improve the 
overall stability and security of the globe, which reduces the existential threats to the 
American way of life.  
 Democratic peace theory has guided U.S. politics since the beginning of the state. It is 
not fully understood what it is about democracy that promotes peace. Research shows the 
theory to be widely relevant but fails to conclude exactly why. Bruce Russett identifies 
another key point to consider regarding democratization: “The policy relevance of the 
observation of democratic peace highlights all the more powerfully the need to fully 
understand what it is about democracy that should be transmitted to other countries.”
4
 It is 
not as simple as overthrowing a dictator and establishing a vote, a lesson hard learned in Iraq 
after the 2003 invasion. Author Larry Diamond highlights the importance of more thorough 
development in his book: “Democratic structures will be mere facades unless people come to 
value the essential principles of democracy: popular sovereignty, accountability of rulers, 
freedom, and the rule of law.”
5
 Building a democracy requires a keen understanding of the 




aiding in the development of the world’s potential democracies, and the social and political 
context of the state to be democratized. 
Liberalism is the guiding school of thought in American politics. It is a belief that 
people are inherently good-natured and that the world can be made a better place when 
people are given freedom and the tools to flourish.  Liberalism, along with the Democratic 
Peace Theory, assumes that spreading democracies in other countries will reduce or end 
wars. Bruce Russett identifies one of the key benefits of democracy over other forms of 
government: “Politics within a democracy is seen as largely a non-zero-sum enterprise: by 
cooperating. All can gain something even if all do not gain equally and the winners are 
restrained from crushing the losers.”
6
 The historical practice of zero-sum mercantilism 
imposed upon foreign colonies by European powers has generated skepticism towards the 
motives of economically-driven former colonial powers. Liberalists tend to overlook the 
barrier of public perception in establishing new democracies. The optimistic view personified 
by the George W. Bush administration that once a dictator was removed from power 
democracy would quickly fall into its place has proven itself false. In practice, building 
democracy is much more complicated. 
There are many in the world who want freedom, democracy, trade, and all the quality 
of life improvements that go with it. These must be cultivated over time. A willing 
population helps but they need the tools to build the foundations of a successful democracy. 
Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten highlight the importance of context in their 
published essay on building democracy: “Domestic context matters: some countries are 
better candidates for democratization than others, and external efforts to bring about 






 First, investments in education and business infrastructure provide the 
brainpower and the economic power to support the population. Second, the establishment of 
the free press and the cultivation of dissent and discourse are necessary to keep the people 
informed and to challenge ideas and policies. Third, a balance of power governmental 
structure is a critical security feature. It has proven difficult to achieve, especially in the early 
days of a new democracy when power is easier to seize. In fact it may be the most difficult 
pillar of western democracy to establish. Schools and businesses can be readily aided by 
outside investors and inside taxes, and the free press is readily embraced by a nation’s 
dissenters, but getting people to share power is dangerous and elusive. Francis Fukuyama 
highlights one of the more difficult aspects of establishing a new regime: “Formal rules can 
be readily changed as a matter of public policy; cultural rules cannot, and while they change 
over time, it is much harder to direct their development.”
8
 Greed and fear cloud long term 
vision as individuals seize the instability in a developing state to improve their own wealth, 
stature, and security. In reality they will all be wealthier and more secure in a stable system 
but that requires long-term thinking, beyond one’s own immediate impulse and even lifespan. 
The dilemma is well stated by Francis Fukuyama, “Even if the society as a whole is better off 
with good institutions, every new institutional arrangement produces winners and losers, and 
the latter can be depended on to protect their relative positions.”
9
 Getting all the pieces of a 
successful democracy to align within the short time frame a state has during a major 
governmental change is incredibly difficult. Failure can create resentment among the 
population and facilitates the perception of an outside hegemon attempting to impose its will 
on a weaker state. Such a perception is often used by those seeking to gain power for 




Huntington identified a major obstacle in the 1960s that still holds true: “In many, if not 
most, modernizing countries elections serve only to enhance the power of disruptive and 
often reactionary social forces and to tear down the structure of public authority.”
10
 
Resentment from failed attempts at democratization has fueled the internal politics of the 
world’s rogue states. Developing the requisite institutions for democracy over time and in 
such a way that promotes goodwill towards the United States is difficult but the correct way 
forward.  
Foreign Policy Goals 
Formulating foreign policy in a democratic society is a complicated matter. The 
United States has vacillated between isolationism and interventionism since its foundation. 
“Ever since independence from the United Kingdom was obtained in the early 18th century, 
one of the most pressing concerns of US foreign policy has been to determine how much 
entanglement in world affairs is good for the welfare of the young nation.”
11
 That statement 
by European political science author Frank Jacob sums up well the dilemma in formulating 
the United States’ foreign policy. As the most powerful nation, economically and militarily, 
US foreign policy is of major concern to most nations of the world, perhaps more so than 
domestically.  
The United States Department of State is responsible for formulating and carrying out 
much of the country’s foreign policy. However, policies and strategies must be coordinated 
with the many other government offices charged with the business of international affairs, 
most notably the Department of Defense. The finer points of war making are beyond the 
scope of this thesis; it will only address the Military Instrument of Power in its role as a tool 




strategy regardless of its budget being a fraction of the Department of Defense. The State 
Department identified areas to improve and created a plan to implement changes with its 
2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) modeled after the 
Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): “[W]e will build up our 
civilian power: the combined force of civilians working together across the U.S. government 
to practice diplomacy, carry out development projects, and prevent and respond to crises. 
Many different agencies contribute to these efforts today. But their work can be more unified, 
more focused, and more efficient.”
12
 Its two overarching goals are to build civilian power for 
diplomacy, development, and crisis response, and to improve interdepartmental cooperation 
to generate a more unified and efficient effort. The military provides credibility to U.S. 
diplomatic efforts by providing force to back-up and counter threats. The overarching 
strategy is to include allies in the business of global security rather than act as a single global 
hegemon. Such a policy is a stronger long-term strategy because it will reduce the acquisition 
of enemies and feelings of resentment if properly executed. Politicians cannot simply ‘wing 
it’ when it comes the nation’s grand strategy and expect to achieve the desired outcome. 
The modern state system is complicated, yet most of the world’s states are on a 
similar path of development and modernization, albeit at differing stages and with widely 
varying forces of resistance. The United States will need to coordinate the efforts of its many 
departments and offices in order to meet the challenges of the modern world, with the 
greatest threat to national security being failed states: “The complex challenges to national 
security in the 21st century will require intelligent integration of resources and unity of effort 
within the government.”
13
 The United States began a massive reorganization in the wake of 




Security, a Director of National Intelligence, and fusion centers where intelligence agencies 
and police departments coordinate information and combine efforts to counter national 
security threats. Former Senior Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) 
at the National Defense University, Patrick Cronin, states: “Coordination...is an essential 
prerequisite for stabilization operations, intelligence collection, and homeland security 
activities.”
14
 Changing the bureaucratic structure is easier than changing bureaucratic culture, 
however, and it has taken agencies some time to establish their niche in the national security 
framework and to adapt to the changing demands of the global environment. Developing a 
synergy among the many departments within the U.S. government is essential to carrying out 
any long-term security and development strategies.  
The United States government recognizes the global environment and the enormous 
influence it has over it, and is seeking to wield that power responsibly. It continues, however, 
with uncoordinated efforts that lead to waste and contradictory objectives.  According to 
Dennis Murphy, a Professor of Information Operations and Information in Warfare at the 
U.S. Army War College: “The current information environment, the American attitude 
toward propaganda, bureaucratic processes that are, by their very nature, cumbersome and 
slow, all combine to make effective strategic communication difficult indeed—but not 
impossible.”
15
 Understanding and acknowledging global issues is only the first major step 
towards adapting. It will take strong leadership and an effective plan to institutionalize the 
cultural changes that need to be made within the various agencies. Bureaucratic cultures, 
however, will not be easily changed. A culture of change ready to adapt to evolving future 
scenarios, capable of quickly reinventing itself to meet rapidly changing demands needs to be 




the internal obstacles that need to be overcome in order to carry out effective national 
strategies. The next step is to find a way to facilitate the necessary cultural changes required 
to execute the mission.  
The purpose of this section is to determine why, and how much, the United States 
ought to entangle itself in international affairs. The strategies and deficiencies of government 
are well established and well researched. However, the question of ‘why’ is not as clear at 
times. Going back to the quote by Frank Jacob reiterates the dilemma of US foreign policy: 
“Ever since independence from the United Kingdom was obtained in the early 18th century, 
one of the most pressing concerns of US foreign policy has been to determine how much 
entanglement in world affairs is good for the welfare of the young nation.”
16
 The answer is 
fairly simple but not always apparent. Former President George W. Bush identified the state 
of affairs in his 2002 National Security Strategy: “America is now threatened less by 
conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than 
by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few. We must defeat these threats 
to our Nation, allies, and friends.”
17
 His statements, now well over a decade old, remain 
relevant. The dynamic of globalization has changed the nature of the world’s problems. Now 
crime, corruption, terrorism, disease, famine, and poverty are global issues that threaten the 
stability of the international system more so than military threats from powerful states. 
Governments are threatened less by other governments and more by internal collapse. These 
global issues spread like famine and threaten to collapse neighboring states. The ‘domino 
effect’ of this era is not one of states falling under communist rule, it is of states collapsing 
into anarchy. The mass interconnectivity of the globalized era means that problems in a 




Monarchies and the old system of interwoven aristocracies have steadily collapsed 
over the past three hundred years. They have given way to self-determination, which has led 
to intense competition among differing ideologies on how governments should be run. 
Samuel Huntington identified the source of this conflict as a disparity between political, 
social, and economic development: “The primary problem of politics is the lag in the 
development of political institutions behind social and economic change.”
18
 The struggle has 
led to multiple world wars and numerous regional conflicts. In the end there were two 
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, championing two competing ideologies 
and bringing much of the world under their influence. The most intense competition, and at 
times conflicts, happened in the “Third World” or the countries not directly aligned with 
either superpower or who were still struggling to emerge from colonialism. Professor Gregg 
Brazinsky, specialist on U.S.-East Asian relations during the Cold War, states U.S. priorities 
during the era. “The United States deemed capturing the loyalties of the vast regions of the 
globe emerging from colonialism as crucial to the struggle against Communism.”
19
 Cold War 
hegemony by either superpower was largely viewed as a continuation of colonialism. 
However, the heat of competition between the two powers’ blinded both to this important 
sensitivity. When the United States emerged in the late 1980s as the lone global power, it was 
largely expected that most other countries would simply adopt the superior form of 
government. However, the world did not share this sentiment and a global power grab ensued 
as people attempted to seize power at home. Many states propped up by the Soviets collapsed 
into anarchy, which aided the emergence of modern terrorist groups such al-Qaeda and the 




Powerful factions could no longer pit one superpower against the other. Instead the 
United States became the leviathan to be feared as dictators instigated conflict to provoke the 
United States in ways that allowed them to maneuver themselves as champions of their 
people fighting the great world imperial power. The golden age of democracy that was 
expected after the dissolution of the Soviet Union did not happen. Instead, many states fell 
into anarchy as they lost the support of the Soviet Union. Establishing and maintaining 
legitimacy is crucial in developing democracies. According to Larry Diamond: “The smaller 
the proportion of citizens who believe a democracy is legitimate, the more vulnerable the 
system is to breakdown, by a military overthrow, an executive seizure of power, a 
disintegration of political order, or a collapse of the state.”
20
 It is instability that creates an 
environment conducive to terrorism and allows rogue regimes to come to power.  
Two threats emerged from the Cold War era that are relevant to this thesis. One is 
that North Korea, recipients of Soviet largesse, had to quickly alter their strategy for survival 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union who were propping the Kim regime up with massive 
amounts of aid. This resulted in an increased pursuit of WMDs as a means of security and 
blackmail. The other was terrorism. Terrorism existed long before the fall of the Soviet 
Union but the failed states left in its wake were perfect recruiting grounds of disenfranchised 
militants. Islamic terrorists, led by Osama bin Laden, developed a ‘far enemy’ strategy and 
began plotting to attack the United States. Resistance to modernization and backlash against 
the United States manifested itself when terrorists attacked the United States on 11 
September 2001. These attacks changed national strategy and forced the nation to begin 
changing its Cold War focus. Alexander Lennon, editor-in-chief of Washington Quarterly, 




point in international relations caused by the September 11, 2001 attacks. “Indeed, one clear 
lesson of September 11, 2001, was that geographic locations traditionally defined as “rear 
area,” such as the U.S. homeland, are increasingly at risk.”
21
 The subsequent Global War on 
Terror has impacted the global community and awakened all to the problems associated with 
globalization.  
This new era of global connectivity and interdependence has disrupted the antiquated 
Westphalian system of respect for state sovereignty and the United States has been at the 
forefront of this push: “The United States needed a motive to become involved in 
international affairs, and issues surrounding democracy, human rights, maintaining stability, 
and opposing aggression were the most likely candidates.”
22
 Yale University Political 
Science professor Elizabeth Saunders predicts potential backlash caused by the Unites States’ 
forceful strategy for international security: “The US strategy of trying to impose its vision of 
international society unilaterally on its allies and its enemies alike may yet backfire. But for 
now, all states must live, however uncomfortably, with the effects of a US policy that makes 
WMD proliferation and terrorism the relevant criteria for inclusion in what can be an 
exclusionary international society.”
23
 Now it is apparent that problems in one state can 
impact the world. Terrorist from a small region are motivated and capable of carrying out 
attacks around the world, and rogue states threaten to upset regional stability. The U.S. 
invasions and forced regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq, in spite of global criticism, 
sent the message that support for terrorism and rogue behavior by sovereign powers will not 
be tolerated. The forced regime changes have sparked the debate over when it is acceptable 
and how they should be carried out. War has its many drawbacks and justification is difficult 




cases where regime change might be justified--and international consensus on this exists--
war is acceptable only when waged in legitimate self-defense or as the collective decision of 
the United Nations Security Council.”
24
 The controversy surrounding the invasion of Iraq is 
regarding President George W. Bush’s preemptive strike against the Ba’ath Party and 
Saddam Hussein. President Bush had labeled Iraq as one of three members of an ‘Axis of 
Evil’ along with Iran and North Korea. Global fallout following the U.S. decision to invade 
Iraq and complicated international stability concerns generate a need to find a better way to 
address the other two members of Bush’s Axis of Evil, Iran and North Korea. These two 
rogue states present their own unique problems and require unique solutions that accomplish 
national security goals while satisfying the international community. Samuel Huntington 
wrote that:  “The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their 
form of government but their degree of government. The differences between democracy and 
dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies 
consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries 
whose politics is deficient in these qualities.”
25
 The two traditional methods of sanctions and 
military force have proven ineffective at changing the behavior of either state. A better way 
forward is to coax rogue states into cultivating consensus, community, legitimacy, 
organization, effectiveness, and stability into their governments by using existing state 
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Chapter III: What Is A Rogue State? 
‘Rogue State” is a term used by the United States to define certain states that do not 
function within international norms. The negative connotations of the term serve political 
interests well. George Washington University Professor of Political Science Elizabeth 
Saunders traces the origins of rogue state doctrine to the early 1990s: “In the 1990s, the term 
‘‘rogue state’’ became fashionable in US foreign policy discourse. The United States 
government bestowed the ‘‘rogue state’’ label on countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, 
and North Korea. The most commonly invoked criteria for ‘‘rogue’’ status were state support 
for terrorism and the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, 
many traditional US allies, especially members of the European Union, consistently rejected 
the ‘‘rogue state’’ label and stronger incarnations such as the ‘axis of evil.’”
1
 There is no 
single definition of a rogue state. Instead it is a politically expedient phrase that serves the 
interest of U.S. politicians. It is, however, a powerful and effective term that describes well 
certain states. The rogue state label, like terrorism, is a highly subjective and highly 
politicized, but ill-defined term. The term came into being sometime near the end of the Cold 
War, according to Elizabeth Saunders. “Although it appears in the Congressional Record as 
early as 1987, when Representative Pete Stark called Iran a ‘‘rogue,’’ it was not until the 
post-Cold War era that the ‘‘rogue state’’ label gained widespread currency within the United 
States.”
2
 The term has menacing connotations and has acted as a powerful political tool for 
‘othering’ or vilifying America’s rivals. Defining the criteria for the rogue state label has 
been a topic of much debate. Middle East Studies expert Barry Rubin offers one definition of 
a rogue state: “A rogue state is one that puts a high priority on subverting other states and 




deterrence or other tools of diplomacy and statecraft.”
3
 His definition, however, is quite 
vague; any state could react unpredictably, and if a state is labeled as a rogue, then by his 
definition it is expected to react differently to conventional forms of coercion. That is the 
problem with Iran and North Korea. They continually have adverse reactions to conventional 
threats, yet the United States continues to rely on threats of sanctions and military force to try 
to coerce both states into more favorable actions. Barry Rubin elaborates upon his definition 
of a rogue state: “Similarly, a rogue state is not just a country whose interests clash with the 
United States, but one that also jeopardizes the international order. Such a state threatens to 
draw the United States into conflict even if America seeks to avoid it.”
4
 Iran and North Korea 
are threats, but their regimes have an interest in avoiding a large-scale conflict with the 
United States that would result in their removal. Instead, they use just enough conflict and 
provocation as a tool for staying in power and blackmailing the international community. 
Further, non-rogue states that are weak, underdeveloped, and unstable are at least as 
threatening to international security.  
Richard Cupitt highlights another problem with the rogue state label. He explains 
“The behavior of friends, though the results in some cases may be more detrimental than the 
action of rogue states, will often be ignored or rationalized.”
5
 This is a powerful statement 
that illustrates the subjectivity of the rogue label. The term “Rogue state” sounds threatening 
and thus simplifies the politics of aggressive policies such as military action and thorough 
sanctions. Misbehavior by allies is justified through different political language. A study 
published in the Journal of Politics and International Affairs and written by Kim Sang-joon 
shows that rogue states do not necessarily exhibit worse behavior than non-rogues: “Rogue 




been posing a universal threat to all nations since the early 1980s. However, the five rogue 
states show relatively similar, or insignificantly worse, behavior patterns in interstate 
disputes compared to non-rogue states during the period 1980-2001.”
6
 The study questions 
the validity of rogue state politics but hints at the power of creating such labels.  
The connotations are strong and it is politically expedient for rallying support for 
expanding budgets. The label removes credibility of states and their supporters once it has 
stuck: “In a sense, the labeling of a country as a rogue state is a certificate of political 
insanity, in terms of the rules of realpolitik and maintaining international order,”
7
 according 
to Barry Rubin. In many ways he is correct. Any talk of normalizing relations with Iran or 
North Korea would likely be met with severe domestic political backlash as has been true 
with politics surrounding the Iran nuclear deal.  
All of this begs the question of whether or not Iran and North Korea are actual threats 
to the United States. The answer is yes. The regimes in both states have cleverly positioned 
themselves as champions of their people by provoking the United States and presenting 
themselves to the people as defenders against a powerful and foreign aggressor. The United 
States has repeatedly played into this role and shows no signs of changing in the near future. 
Both nations are developing WMDs and have ties to terrorist organizations. Iran and North 
Korea understand that their conventional threats are no match for the military power of the 
United States. Both have developed asymmetric strategies and pursued nuclear weapons to 
offset their conventional disadvantages. Both states have historically supported terrorist 
groups. Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution Thomas Henriksen 
attributes Iran and North Korea’s increase in pursuit of WMDs to the 2003 U.S. invasion of 




saw Iraq’s sad fate for pretending to have nuclear arms.”
8
 The threat of invasion had the 
opposite effect from what was intended; Instead of convincing Iran and North Korea to 
comply with U.S. demands it caused them to increase their research and development of 
asymmetric warfare capabilities and nuclear weapons. 
There are multiple rogue states, but none have been as belligerent or complicated as 
Iran and North Korea. Both possess all the elements of a rogue state such as irrational 
behavior, pursuit of WMDs, and support for terrorism, extreme human rights violations, and 
brinksmanship. There are complications to dealing with both as Larry Diamond points out in 
his 2008 book The Spirit of Democracy. “In the case of Iran, the Arab Gulf states, Nigeria, 
and more recently Azerbaijan and Venezuela (under Hugo Chavez), Western dependence on 
their vast oil revenues greatly diminishes the leverage of the rich democracies.”
9
 North Korea 
has its major regional complications as well. Dr. Bruce Bechtol sums up the threat in his 
comprehensive book on the threats and uncertainties of the North Korean regime: “Because 
of North Korea’s ability to retaliate and its unpredictable government, any preemptive strike 
would have to be so widespread and on such a large scale that undoubtedly it would cause an 
all-out war on the Korean Peninsula.”
10
 There is also the issue of China’s involvement with 
North Korea. Thomas Henriksen sums it up quite bluntly “China will not permit a sanction-
induced implosion of the North Korean regime.”
11
 Both Iran and North Korea are open about 
their hatred of the United States and their desire to destroy it along with its allies. Just as Iraq 
is an extreme case of failed state-building, Iran and North Korea are extreme cases of rogue 
states that provide an excellent catalyst for the formulation of better state-building policy. 
The current policy of containment prolongs the suffering of their citizens and allows each 




Origins of the Axis of Evil 
Strong and stable states are better equipped to combat the problems associated with 
globalization such as poverty, disease, famine, international crime, terrorism, and WMD 
proliferation. President Barack Obama singled out this point in his opening to the 2010 
National Security Strategy (NSS): “The United States is part of a dynamic international 
environment, in which different nations are exerting greater influence, and advancing our 
interests will require expanding spheres of cooperation around the world.”
12
 Other states can 
provide regional stability through security efforts as well as economic and human 
development. President Obama also wrote about the importance of this trend in his 2010 
NSS: “Due to increased economic growth and political stability, individual nations are 
increasingly taking on powerful regional and global roles and changing the landscape of 
international cooperation.”
13
 Combatting the many globalized threats requires cooperation 
among the world’s powers. The ability to combat global threats is weakened when states are 
at odds with each other. Therefore, labeling a state or regime as an enemy has long-term 
political and social implications.  
 The George W. Bush administration was adamant about confronting the nation’s 
enemies boldly and directly, which manifested in his famous labeling of an “Axis of Evil” in 
regards to states seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and believed to be in 
alliance with terrorist organizations in his 2002 State of the Union address (SOTU). President 
Bush declared “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute and axis of evil, arming 
to threaten the peace of the world.”
14
 Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were the three states 




The usage of the term “evil” implies the purely malicious intent of these states and 
seemed fitting in the emotionally-charged wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 
Labeling them the “axis” evokes the threatening nature of the World War II Axis Powers. 
The phrase stuck and became a powerful political rallying point for actions against all three 
states. It also acted as a turning point in the focus of the War on Terror. Senior Research 
Associate at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Daniel Heradstveit, along with 
colleague and Syracuse University Professor of Political Science G. Matthew Bonham 
conducted research on the impact of former President Bush’s labeling of Iran as a member of 
the Axis of Evil. The authors concluded “The use of the phrase Axis of Evil was a 
restructuring of the American understanding of the ‘War on Terror,’ in which the focus 
shifted from Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa‘ida, with their allies and bases in Afghanistan, to a 
series of other states, whose involvement in that operation ranged from minimal to non-
existent.”
15
 The damage may not have been apparent to most observers during the frenzy that 
followed the September 11, 2001 attacks, however, Heradstveit and Bonham point out “Prior 
to the Axis of Evil speech, Iranian-American relations had been undergoing a thaw.”
16
 The 
U.S. operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and its hunting of Osama bin Laden 
served the mutual interest of Iran who was on the side of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance. 
According to Heradstveit and Bonham, “Following the attacks of 9/11, Iran and the United 
States now had a common interest in crushing the Taliban. Iran envisaged a new geopolitical 
role for itself in Afghanistan and Central Asia, in alliance with the United States.”
17
 The 
inclusion of Iran in the Axis of Evil reaffirmed for Iranian hardliners America’s role as “The 




since autocracies rely on the threat of outside enemies to justify their harsh internal 
repression.  
The phrase itself has strong connotations and effectively altered domestic views of 
Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as co-conspiring villains and served to rally domestic political 
support for sanctions and military actions against the three states. A U. S. senator testifying 
before Congress in 2007 on the results of sanctions against targeted regimes explained the 
counterproductive nature of such tactics: “If anything, the anti-American sentiment aroused 
by sanctions often strengthens the popularity of such leaders who use America as the 
convenient scapegoat to divert attention from their own tyranny.”
18
 Any attempt at rallying 
domestic support for actions against another country by vilifying that country may also be 
used to rally domestic political support within the targeted country, thus making it more 
difficult to improve relations, cooperation, and ultimately security. President Bush’s speech 
undoubtedly achieved both results.  
The domestic impacts of the speech within the United States were that it restructured 
thinking on the War on Terror. According to Heradstveit and Bonham, “The key concepts in 
this restructuring have been firstly ‘terrorist states,’ which implies the ‘indivisibility of 
terrorism’ and therefore that the collective responsibility for 9/11 is on any state so 
designated; and secondly, weapons of mass destruction, because anyone who possesses them 
may be tempted to sell or give them to terrorists, thus evoking fears of chemical, biological, 
or even nuclear attacks on American cities.”
19
 The Bush administration took the fear of the 
9/11 attacks to its logical maximum; belligerent and unpredictable states transferring WMDs 
to terrorist organizations and using them as a proxy to strike the United States suddenly was a 




to militant groups they cannot control. It could perhaps be used as a last ditch effort to strike 
while the United States prepares to invade, but the complexity of most WMD technology 
makes it prohibitive to the terrorist groups operating in the early 2000s. 
Implications of the Speech 
The ‘Axis of Evil’ speech effectively combined terrorism, WMDs, and Rogue States 
into a single enemy of the United States. Weapons of Mass Destruction were of increasing 
concern due to the vulnerability of the United States homeland and the nullification of the 
safety of Mutually Assured Destruction because terrorist groups do not represent a single 
state that can be targeted. Terrorists have also proven willing to sacrifice themselves and 
others for shock value. The mistake Saddam Hussein made was bluffing about having 
WMDs. That instigated an invasion, which in turn motivated Iran and North Korea to step up 
their pursuit of functional WMDs. North Korea successfully detonated a nuclear device 
within three years of the U.S. invasion of Iraq as noted by Dr. Bruce Bechtol: “On October 9, 
2006 the North Koreans conducted their first plutonium underground nuclear test, effectively 
ending any debate about whether they actually had nuclear weapons.”
20
 North Korea has 
likely transferred some of its technology to Iran, a nation with direct ties to the terrorist group 
Hezbollah. North Korea may have aided the group in the construction of underground tunnels 
used to fight Israelis in Lebanon as Bruce Bechtol also states in his book: “Several reports 
note that all or most of Hezbollah's underground facilities were built primarily under the 
supervision of North Korean instructors in 2003-2004.”
21
 The labeling as an enemy, the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, along with longstanding sanctions against both countries, left Iran and North 




The implications of the Axis of Evil speech are clear: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea 
were the enemies of the United States. The three states, each with their own eccentric and 
tyrannical leaders, provided a more recognizable villain than faceless, stateless, terrorists. 
The label undoubtedly evokes a strong sense that something must be done quickly. Daniel 
Heradstveit discussed the usage of the ‘axis’ metaphor and concluded “It appears rather that 
Bush was using the Axis metaphor in the original sense, to suggest that Iraq, Iran, and North 
Korea were not only Evil countries in themselves, but were in alliance with one another 
against the rest of us. In other words, this is not merely Evil but a conspiracy of Evil.”
22
 It 
was designed to rally domestic support for programs targeting these three countries. The side 
effect is that it set back prior advancements in diplomatic relations with the labeled states. 
The speech gave increased credibility to Iranian hardliners as Daniel Heradstveit notes in his 
research: “The conservatives took the speech as the final proof that their enemy image of the 
United States had been right all along, and that the reformers, with their wish for dialogue, 
were naïve. And it is very hard for the reformers to argue with this, as most people will 
perceive the Axis of Evil to be insulting and degrading.”
23
 Relations with Iran have been 
particularly tense since the speech by President Bush. The United States has been challenged 
in the region by Iran who has helped instigate instability in Iraq, challenged the United States 
in the Straits of Hormuz, and worked with North Korea to purchase missile and nuclear 
technologies. According to Francois Heisbourg, chairman of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, Bush’s threats toward Iran have encouraged its further 
development of nuclear technology: “If a country--Iran particularly comes to mind--becomes 
convinced that it will be the next object of U.S. attempts at regime change, for example, it is 






 To reiterate a previous quote from Daniel Heradstveit:  “Prior to 
the Axis of Evil speech, Iranian-American relations had been undergoing a thaw.”
25
 The 
speech set U.S.-Iranian diplomacy back well over decade with no real progress towards 
recovering.  
The implications were much more substantial and immediate for Iraq. The U.S. 
invasion in 2003 quickly routed the Iraqi military and removed Saddam Hussein from power. 
The aftermath, however, proved a long and difficult effort. Explaining the reasons for the 
invasion has long been the source of debate. The ‘axis of evil’ speech was certainly a factor 
in setting up support for the war, as international relations scholar Raymond Hinnebusch 
explained: “The Bush doctrine and the 2002 National Security Strategy, formulated in 
response to the 9/11 attacks, make explicit the coercive turn: the call for ‘full spectrum 
dominance’; the strategy of dealing with resistance to the US not simply through traditional 
containment, but via ‘preventive wars’; the resort to unilateralism, with ad hoc ‘coalitions of 
the willing’; the view that states not with the US in the war on terrorism are against it; and 
the claim that only the US liberal model is legitimate, with sovereignty exempting no nation 
from the demand that it conform.”
26
 The implications of which have been the loss of U.S. 
blood and treasure, the increased pursuit of WMDs by Iran and North Korea, the 
destabilization of the Middle East, and the formation of the Islamic State terrorist group that 
continues to plague regional security and poses an increasing global threat.  
The invasion of Iraq, and the grouping of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as equal threats 
to U. S. national security was an anomaly of U.S. foreign policy as Raymond Hinnebusch 
explains, “This, of course, is all quite a change from traditional US foreign policy that was 




derived from multilateral consultation, hence necessarily limited by international law and 
institutions and requiring a priority for diplomacy over military force.”
27
 The effects of which 
we will continue to feel for the foreseeable future unless policy is changed or returned to the 
status quo. The United States has done little to thaw relations with Iran or improve its 
handling of North Korea in spite of a substantial administration change. White House 
correspondent and columnist for U.S. News & World Report Kenneth Walsh broke down the 
weakness of the Axis of Evil speech in an article written shortly after the speech was 
delivered: “For one thing, describing Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an axis of evil suggests 
links among the three that don't exist. Iran and Iraq are mortal enemies. And while North 
Korea has supplied missile technology to Iran, Pyongyang remains one of the most isolated 
totalitarian states in the world.”
28
 North Korea sells its nuclear technology to Iran out of 
necessity for capital and not as part of an underlying conspiracy between the two; Iran is 
seeking increased weapons capability to deter an attack from the United States.   
The ambiguity of the Bush doctrine had many consequences due to the openness of 
its interpretation. He used prevention and preemption interchangeably, which left many in the 
international community confused as to his intentions. Francois Heisbourg summarized the 
problem well: “If the Bush doctrine strictly boiled down to preemption--in turn, tied to the 
concept of imminent threat--then the new U.S. national security strategy would not 
necessarily involve upsetting basic principles governing the use of force in international 
relations. Conversely, when preemption is used interchangeably with prevention and both are 
subject to wide interpretation, the legitimization of the use of force may be revolutionized.”
29
 
Its vagueness can be attributed to strategic flexibility, but I attribute it to a lack of 




written in 2002. The broadening of the War on Terror from its focus on defeating al-Qaeda 
into a mission of defeating the Axis of Evil came from a measure of cognitive dissonance 
over the fact that a non-state actor was able to carry out such a devastating and direct attack 
against the United States. 
Kenneth Walsh had his own interpretation shortly after the speech was delivered: 
“Bush had other goals, too. One was to prod Congress into passing his proposed $48 billion 
in spending increases for the Pentagon this year. Another was to rally support for his own 
version of Reagan's missile defense system--one that Bush says would protect against attacks 
by rogue nations. Finally, if there is another terrorist attack, Bush can say he did all he could 
to avoid it.”
30
 The President had already been widely criticized for his initially subdued 
reaction to the 9/11 attacks.  
The 9/11 attacks happened at a time when Americans were feeling invulnerable. No 
such attack had taken place on U. S. soil since the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941.  
The response to Pearl Harbor was swift and decisive. The United States went to war against 
well-defined and powerful enemies who threatened much of the world with tyranny. The 
Soviet Union was unwilling to attack the U. S. homeland directly due to fear of reprisal 
widely known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) where both countries possessed 
enough weapons to destroy each other many times over. Unfortunately, the conspirators 
behind the 9/11 attacks had no fear of reprisal, they had no country to defend, and it may be 
that Americans needed to believe that a more tangible group, such as Iraq, Iran, and North 
Korea were somehow conspirators behind the attacks. Something largely accepted no matter 
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Chapter IV: The Problem With Sanctions 
 Broad sanctions have been the preferred tool of statecraft for those desiring to do 
something about problem states while avoiding the expense and political backlash military 
engagements. Research shows that they are overwhelmingly ineffective and mostly serve the 
interests of domestic politicians needing to display action against offensive behavior within 
the international community. Researcher in the Department of Economics at Tilburg 
University in the Netherlands, Manuel Oechslin, defined the desired end-state of sanctions: 
“There is a general notion that, as Mack and Khan (2000) put it, ‘the pain inflicted by 
sanctions on citizens of target states will cause them to pressure their government into 
making the changes demanded by the sanctioning body.’ But very little analytical work has 
actually been devoted to the exact channels through which sanctions are supposed to promote 
democratization.”
1
 Basically sanctions are implemented on little more than the belief that 
they will work and there is insufficient research defining how they will actually achieve 
democracy. In short, sanctions are a politically expedient tactic for domestic politicians to 
achieve the desire of their constituents to take non-military action against foreign regimes.  
 There is much research into the ineffectiveness of sanctions to produce democratic 
reforms. Much of the research shows that sanctions actually harm liberties in the targeted 
country. Cooper Drury and Dursun Peksen found sanctions to be harmful to political liberties 
in their study. “The empirical findings—based on analysis of time-series cross-national data 
over a 28-year (1972–2000) period—support the assertion that the presence of sanctions 
reduces political liberties in target countries.”
2
 Their research also shows that time is a factor 
in the damage caused by sanctions: “Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that the longer 






 Short-term sanctions targeted at specific behavior may still be a valuable tool 
for international statecraft, but broad sanctions designed to achieve idealist goals are 
corrosive to the populations they are designed to help. A 2013 working paper by research 
fellows Dr. Christian von Soest and Dr. Michael Wahman at the German Institute of Global 
Area Studies differentiates two objectives of sanctions: “Some sanctions, like those aimed at 
ending nuclear proliferation or at punishing regimes that harbor terrorists, are directly related 
to national security concerns. Democratic sanctions, on the other hand, are less directly 
connected to classic realist goals of international politics.”
4
 Most sanctions are little more 
than an act to appease domestic constituents and often cause harm to the populations they are 
intended to help. Some forms of targeted sanctions applied in conjunction with specific 
goals, however, can be effective tools of coercion. This chapter discusses the research 
consensus of sanctions as well as their application toward Iran and North Korea. 
The Research Consensus 
 The research consensus is that sanctions cause more harm than good. Most sanctions 
are designed to appease political constituents’ desire for leaders to take action against 
offensive behavior of foreign governments; they are a domestic show of force. Norwegian 
scholar Ketil Fred Hansen, and Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs Axel Borchgrevink made multiple conclusions about the causes and effects of 
sanctions. They identified the basic goal of most sanctions: “As a rule, the official goal of 
sanctions is to reprimand a regime. However, empirical experience over the past 20 years has 
shown that it is primarily the civilian population that suffers, whereas the regime and elite are 
much better protected from the effects of sanctions.”
5
 They concluded that sanctions actually 




afflicted population. The research by Dursun Peksen and A. Cooper Drury supports this 
viewpoint. The duo concludes “the regime seeks to mitigate the impact of the economic costs 
caused by the sanctions by taking control of the economy or intervening in it to influence the 
flow of wealth.”
6
 They found that sanctions harm any opposition within the sanctioned 
country: “The second effect of the regime’s intervention in the post-sanction market is to 
limit resources flowing to opposition groups… Consequently, this combination of shifting 
resources in the target regime’s favor and declining economic capacity of opposition groups 
makes it unlikely that the target regime will be coerced.”
7
 This is a problem if the sanctions 
are designed to instigate a democratic transition.  
As another example, the longstanding U.S. sanctions against the small island nation 
of Cuba have failed to topple the Castro regime, yet remain in place to the detriment of 
Cubans due to ideological differences between the United States and Cuba and due to 
continued lobbying in the United States by Bautista supporters. As one congressman stated in 
a 2007 joint hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade:  
“China, Russia, the Middle East, North Korea and Cuba all represent huge markets for our 
farm products yet many in Congress favor current or proposed trade restrictions that prevent 
our farmers from selling to the billions of people in these areas.”
8
 In this case ideological 
differences do not explain the continued sanctions because the United States and People’s 
Republic of China share the same ideological differences, yet are powerful trading partners. 
Lifting sanctions against Cuba would have a limited impact on the United States and possibly 
a disproportionate impact on Cuba. Therefore, a conclusion to be drawn from that case is that 




yet they maintain a measure of political support from voters who believe the Castro regime 
ought to be punished.  
Sanctions, effective or not, play an important role in international politics. Hansen 
and Borchgrevink make this point in their research: “One aim of economic sanctions can be 
to signal internationally that the behaviour of the regime in question is unacceptable.”
9
 
Sanctions send a clear signal in international politics where other types of messaging can be 
misinterpreted. It sends a clear message that the sanctioning state is willing to take action 
against an offending regime. Sanctions need not be internationally coordinated if signaling is 
their primary intention as Hansen and Borchgrevink also point out: “If the most important 
objectives concern political gains related to media, national public opinion and the building 
of an international image, it obviously matters less whether sanctions are internationally 
coordinated or not.”
10
 International sanctions can be more effective, however, when 
coordinated between states, especially when they are narrow in scope and targeted at specific 
offenders within a regime.  
Smart Sanctions 
 Targeted sanctions, or ‘smart sanctions’ have potential as a tool of statecraft when 
used in conjunction with grand strategy and to achieve immediate goals. Broad sanctions 
have proven harmful to targeted populations. They are often presented to the public in the 
context of promoting democratic reforms abroad. They are designed, however, to promote 
domestic political interests such as appeasing constituents’ desire to see action taken against 
the undesirable behavior of international actors. They also send a clear signal that certain 
behaviors are undesirable. The research consensus is that broad sanctions, typically 




liberties in the targeted population as well as weaken internal liberal opposition to oppressive 
regimes. Fred Hansen and Axel Borchgrevink found a use for sanctions, however: “One 
lesson that emerges from the sanctions literature is that in order to be efficient, sanctions 
should have clear and limited objectives.”
11
 Targeted sanctions, or smart sanctions, have a 
shorter lifespan and much more specific focus than typical economic sanctions.  Daniel 
Drezner, professor of International Politic, defined smart sanctions: “Ostensibly, smart or 
targeted sanctions are the precision-guided munitions of economic statecraft. They are 
designed to hurt elite supporters of the targeted regime, while imposing minimal hardship on 
the mass public.”
12
 For example, smart sanctions were used against the North Korean elite in 
2005 to bring them back to the bargaining table to discuss their nuclear program. 
Thomas H. Henriksen, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, wrote about the 
effectiveness of the 2005 smart sanctions against North Korea in his book America and the 
Rogue States: “Responding to North Korea’s money laundering from drug sales and 
counterfeiting American currency, Washington took Action. The US Treasury’s Operation 
Smoking Dragon imposed financial sanctions on Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macau in late 
September 2005.”
13
 The United States is the most economically powerful state in the world 
and that power gives it great influence over the global banking industry. All regimes need 
money and access to U.S. markets is one of the largest sources of it. Members of the Kim 
regime were laundering money through Banco Delta Asia in Macau. The United States 
threatened sanctions against the bank for its complicity in aiding the Kim regime. The threat 
of losing access to the U.S. money market was enough to convince the bank to freeze assets 
to the family. That in turn got their attention and brought North Korean leaders back to 




Nonproliferation, and Trade, Brad Sherman identified the need for the United States to use its 
greatest power assets to achieve its goals in his opening statements to a 2007 Senate hearing: 
“The greatest challenge to America is combatting terrorism and proliferation of WMD. The 
greatest power of America is our economic power. It is long past time that we have hearings 
to see how we can bring our greatest power to deal with our greatest threats to our national 
security.”
14
 He identifies the goals of the Senate hearing: “Our goal is to affect the behavior 
of U.S. companies and their subsidiaries, foreign companies, particularly oil companies and 
banks, the World Bank and other international organizations.”
15
 The sanctions against Banco 
Delta Asia are an excellent example of what targeted sanctions can achieve. Member of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs Edward R. Royce stated one of the other positive gains 
from the targeted sanctions against North Korean leaders in the same 2007 hearing: “Perhaps 
a greater consequence was the message that was sent to bankers throughout the region about 
the pitfalls of dealing with the North Koreans, and as a consequence of that several cut ties to 
the regime.”
16
 Dursun Peksen describes the benefits of targeted sanctions over broad 
sanctions as at least minimizing the unintended negative effects of broader sanctions: “At 
minimum, such targeted sanctions in the forms of arms embargoes, financial asset freezes or 
international travel bans on the political elites will not worsen the economic well-being of the 
opposition.”
17
 Targeted sanctions have potential as an effective tool of international statecraft 
that can put pressure on members of oppressive regimes.  
The economic influence of the United States is particularly potent because 
oppressors tend to hold power for their own financial benefit. Squeezing that benefit is 
a quick way to bring them to negotiations as the United States proved with the sanctions 




back to negotiations over their nuclear program. According to David Asher, Victor 
Comras, and Patrick Cronin in their book Pressure: Coercive Economic Statecraft and 
U.S. National Security:  “The use of targeted financial measures does not obviate the 
need for economic sanctions but rather adds to their potential effectiveness.”
18
 They 
elaborate by explaining how the two can be used in conjunction, “Pressure strategies 
that are well conceived and executed (meaning that they are characterized by clear 
objectives and a deep understanding of an adversary’s vulnerabilities and decision-
making calculus) can counter, contain and disrupt dangerous and destabilizing behavior 
from mass killings to nuclear proliferation.”
19
 In short, the goals and results of any 
sanctions episode need to be limited and measureable within a narrow time frame. 
Embargoes lasting decades do nothing more than appease domestic political groups and 
harm the targeted populations, decreasing liberalism and democracy.   
Case Study: Iran’s nuclear development 
Broad sanctions have failed to stop Iran’s nuclear development. U. S. relations with 
Iran became intensely adversarial after the 1979 revolution and hostage crisis. According to 
Navid Hassibi at the Research Group in International Politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen 
in Belgium: “Iran has faced sanctions since the early days of the Islamic Revolution that 
resulted from the 1979 US Embassy hostage crisis. Over the last decade, however, its nuclear 
activity has triggered a comprehensive set of economic, trade, personnel, and military 
sanctions.”
20
 The leaders of the Iranian revolution used U. S. support for the Pahalavi regime 
as an initial justification of its rise to power. They have subsequently used U. S. sanctions as 
continued justification for their political repression of their own citizens. Author and lecturer 




himself leading a revolution that was, and remains, plural in construction and united only in 
its enmity toward its common foe, the shah and his puppet master, the United States.”
21
 
Iranian hardliners have leaned on this adversarial relationship as a source of support and 
power. Shahram Chubin, Director of Research at the Geneva Centre for Security Studies in 
Switzerland, and Robert Litwak, director of the Division of International Studies at Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., summed up the complexity of 
the Iranian predicament: “The particular experience of Iran--revolution, war, sanctions, and 
estrangement from international society--has created a shared sense of embattlement in a 
hostile environment, leaving little scope for debate.”
22
 There is a discrepancy between 
Iranian and American worldview and political culture that has prevented the two nations 
from reaching agreements on major issues in the Middle East. Mahmood Sariolghalam, 
associate professor at the School of Economics and Political Science of the Shahid Beheshti 
(National) University of Iran in Tehran, explains the differences between the two worldviews 
and political cultures: 
Iran’s current leadership makes foreign policy decisions fundamentally on 
revolutionary idealism, especially on the Palestinian issue, rejecting the two-
state solution; pursues a security doctrine based on ambiguity; assists military 
groups, characterizing them as freedom fighters; and confronts U.S. 
dominance in the Middle East. In contrast, the United States is determined to 
institutionalize the two-state solution, regards an unfriendly Iran’s security 
doctrine as opposed to its interests and those of Israel, views Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad as terrorist groups, and aims to contain Iran’s Middle East 




Understanding the political needs of a rival government is essential to designing effective 
strategies to coerce that government into favorable actions.  
Iran and North Korea both continue their nuclear development programs in spite of 




from the United States. Iran’s program is not as developed as that of other proliferators such 
as Pakistan or North Korea, but they were well on their way to building nuclear capacity for a 
weapon until the 2015 nuclear deal. The nuclear deal attempts to remove secrecy from the 
Iranian program and allowed them to develop nuclear energy in ways that limit their ability 
to develop nuclear weapons. Shahram Chubin and Robert Litwak predicted the consequences 
of Iran’s secrecy: “Heightened suspicion that Iran’s civilian nuclear energy infrastructure 
masks a clandestine weapons program has galvanized international cooperation among the 
United States, the European Union, and Russia and is likely to result in increased external 
pressure on Iran to remain in compliance with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
commitments.”
24
 There is motivation derived from its intense adversarial relations with the 
United States, its desire to act as regional hegemon, the need for the ruling elite to maintain 
power and relevance among their own population, and access to technology from fellow 
‘Axis of Evil’ member North Korea. Research scholar at Princeton University and former 
diplomat Seyed Mousavian wrote in 2014: “The West, by denying the rights of Iran to a 
peaceful nuclear program, gave the greatest impetus for Iran to press for self-sufficiency by 
completing unfinished projects and ensuring domestic supply of reactor fuel in the future.”
25
 
Iran is notoriously vague in its political dealings, which fosters greater suspicion regarding its 
intentions for its nuclear program. According to Shahram Chubin and Robert Litwak:  “The 
implicit rationale for the nuclear weapons program lies in the worldview of the hard-liners, 
who see the program as the ultimate guarantor of Iran’s influence and security and, not 
incidentally, their own political power.”
26
 Iranian leaders provoke the United States and use 
America’s reaction to their provocations as justification of an existential threat that in turn 




trap repeatedly since at least 1979. It can be avoided in the future by leaving Iran ways out of 
provocative actions that preserve their dignity. The 2015 nuclear deal with Iran is designed to 
accomplish that. Time will tell whether or not it is successful and other factors, such as the 
outcome of U.S. elections, can influence its overall success.  
Placing Iran and North Korea into the same category of enemies of the United States 
created a bond between the two where one had not previously existed. With the United States 
as common enemy and having both been largely sanctioned out of trade with the rest of the 
international community both countries have had little choice but to cooperate with each 
other. Francois Heisbourg made a strong point in 2011 that the United States has provided 
the catalyst for further nuclear proliferation: “Indeed, one of the lessons that an overtly 
targeted country such as Iran might draw from the North Korean case is that possession of a 
nuclear deterrent precludes the United States from considering military action.”
27
 Kenneth 
Waltz identified nuclear weapons as a defensive weapon, a condition that manifested itself 
during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union where Mutually 
Assured Destruction became the accepted outcome of a nuclear showdown. Iran could 
effectively hold the Middle East hostage if it were to acquire nuclear capabilities. The fear is 
that they could then begin to support terrorist groups once again without fear of military 
invasion. After all, the Kim regime remains in power in North Korea in spite of its aggressive 
provocations and being at a conventional military disadvantage (that is not to discount the 
factor of a possible confrontation with China). The threat of a single nuclear strike against 
South Korea or Japan is catastrophic enough to force even the world’s only superpower to 
tread with caution when dealing with the rogue nation. Seyed Mousavian makes an important 




term regional advantage, but one that would turn into longer-term vulnerability as it would 
lead to a regional arms race.”
28
 Iran has many rivals in the complex Middle Eastern 
environment. Possession of nuclear weapons could provoke any number of adverse reactions, 
notably the placement of U.S. nuclear assets in the region. The United States remained 
poised to launch a nuclear counterstrike against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. It 
has also sanctioned North Korea into extreme poverty. At the same time the United States 
has ignored, or at least responded without military action, nuclear proliferation among states 
who do not rely on extreme anti-U.S. sentiment for power. Seyed Mousavian identifies it as a 
double standard applied to Iran by the west: “When compared with the West’s pressure on 
Iran (which has not acquired nuclear weapons), the strategic relations of the P5+1 to Israel, 
India, and Pakistan (which have nuclear weapons and are not parties to the NPT) clearly 
show that the West applies a double standard in its nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament 
strategy.”
29
 This double standard comes from Iran’s extremist rhetoric against the United 
States and its ally Israel. Very public anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric make it easy to 
villainize by powerful lobby groups in the United States. This villain image was galvanized 
by former President George W. Bush’s 2002 ‘Axis of Evil’ speech where he effectively tied 
Iran to North Korea, Iraq, and the September 11, 2001 attacks in the minds of the American 
public. The 9/11 attacks and the following campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan gave 
the United States and Iran a reason to cooperate, which would have easily opened up the 
lines of communication between the two states. Bush’s speech, however, cut those ties and 
rekindled the adversarial relationship between the two states: “The metaphor targets entire 
countries, not their leaders. It does not differentiate between the evil leaders and the others 
who live in the country.”
30




alienated Iranian moderates who would have been much more open to cooperation with the 
United States prior to the speech; the speech polarized both nations until the 2015 nuclear 
deal which has been a breakthrough in relations.  
Iran’s nuclear provocations inspired multilateral sanctions led by the United States. 
According to Navid Hassibi and Tom Sauer easing of these sanctions will be necessary in 
order to advance negotiations with Iran: “A peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear 
standoff will require a negotiated settlement, undoubtedly including some form of sanctions 
relief package.”
31
 Any talk of easing up on Iran meets with political backlash in the United 
States where Iran is often portrayed as an unpredictable rogue with aspirations to eliminate 
the state of Israel, attitudes to which the Iranian government’s rhetoric easily lends 
credibility. This has been the case with the 2015 nuclear deal. Plenty of obstacles work 
against the easing of sanctions and improvement of U.S.-Iran relations. Hassibi and Sauer 
identified some obstacles to lifting sanctions: “Two potential roadblocks exist when it comes 
to lifting legislated sanctions. One is that some of these laws also refer to non-nuclear issues, 
such as human rights and links to terrorism.”
32
 They also discuss the lack of will among U.S. 
politics combined with heavy influence from lobby groups: “Another obstacle is the lack of 
political will on Capitol Hill that could threaten efforts to soften sanctions. The longstanding 
influence that certain lobbying entities such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC) exert over Congress is a notable factor.”
33
 The aforementioned factors combined 
with the pro-Israel views of American evangelicals and the distrust of Muslims that exists 
among many U.S. voters make it less likely that U.S. politicians will support the lifting of 
sanctions. Such a move could be widely unpopular among voters who still see Iran as a 




Case Study: North Korea’s nuclear development and brinksmanship 
 The failures of sanctions against North Korea to stop its nuclear development are 
much sharper in contrast to Iran where development has been stalled for the time being. 
Hostilities between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea date 
back to the end of World War II when the Korean Peninsula was partitioned at the 38th 
parallel into separate zones of control by the United States to the South and the Soviet Union 
to the North. The DPRK survived the downfall of the Soviet Union and persisted under the 
dynastic rule of Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, and Kim Chong-un. According to Barry Rubin:  
“Its bizarre internal dictatorship, invasion of South Korea in 1950, and direct involvement in 
terrorism guaranteed it a place on the roster of rogues.”
34
 They have become the 
quintessential rogue state with perpetual brinksmanship, nuclear ambition, illicit activities, 
and support for terrorist organizations. This behavior is unlikely to stop as long as the status 
quo is maintained as explained by Angelo State University Professor of Political Science 
Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.: “As long as the DPRK assesses that it can advance its foreign policy 
through brinkmanship and provocations-and no signs indicate that the leadership in 
Pyongyang has stopped believing it-we can expect North Korea to take a variety of action to 
“push the edge of the envelope.”
35
 The North Korean nuclear program serves two purposes; 
security and money for the Kim family. The country is already known as ‘the hermit 
kingdom’ due to its extreme isolation from the international community, both self-imposed 
and through sanctions. They have learned to work around sanctions and are continually 
finding ways to generate cash for the regime while the people live in poverty. Bruce Bechtol 
summed up the difficulty of sanctioning the Kim regime: “What is certain is that North 




themselves in order to survive and provide money for the Kim family, the elite, and the 
military.”
36
 The regime has proven itself resilient in spite of decades of increasing sanctions. 
Thomas Henriksen elaborates the failures of the United States in his book America and the 
Rogue States: “The United States’ decades-long engagement of North Korea yielded little 
beyond Pyongyang’s broken promises, frustrating artful dodges, and its relentless pursuit of 
nuclear weaponry.”
37
 These conditions create tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Containment 
policies prolong the humanitarian crisis that exists in North Korea and leave it unprepared to 
be integrated into South Korea or the international community.  
 The prospect of unification raises important questions and concerns regarding 
sanctions. While there may be plenty of ways to forcibly or peacefully unify the 
peninsula, there are serious concerns that require attention in advance of any unification 
efforts. Decades of sanctions against North Korea, and exploitation of the population by 
the Kim family, have left North Korea in a derelict state. It stands in stark contrast to 
the Republic of Korea’s rise as a well-developed industrial power with strong alliances. 
The disparity between the two Koreas is too great for unification at this time. Any 
future potential for unification requires the North to be brought closer to the South’s 
level of development. Doing so would require breaking the North’s isolation from the 
world and this cannot be done with current policies.  
China is also a major factor in any dealings with North Korea. Thomas 
Henriksen pointed out China’s goals for the DPRK: “Beijing’s goal before and after the 
crowning of Kim Jung-un in his father’s place remains to nudge the DPRK along the 
Chinese-blazed trail of market socialism while retaining a loose overlordship over its 
militarized vassal.”
38




relationship, however, ideological differences over the future of North Korea combined 
with the past experience of having been drawn into a war against each other by the 
North complicate the advancement of policy. David Shambaugh explains the PRC’s 
views as to the best way forward for the DPRK: “China’s Korea analyst draw explicit 
parallels to Maoist China (particularly during the Great Leap Forward) and argue that 
North Korea’s only viable option to avoid national suicide is to follow China’s 
reformist example.”
39
 The problem with allowing North Korea to develop is twofold. 
The first issue is that it would require recognition that the Kim regime is legitimate. The 
second issue is that it would concede to the Chinese model of developmental 
authoritarianism. Both are conditions that will not sit well within U.S. politics and could 
be used to weaken alliances between the United States and regional actors such as 
South Korea and Japan. Conceding power to China may also embolden it to take greater 
actions toward fully asserting its claims to Taiwan and many smaller islands currently 
under international dispute in the Pacific. Giving China greater license to act as regional 
hegemon is an issue of concern due to the PRC’s poor human rights record and the 
relative loss of U.S. power in the region. Progress is gridlocked due to conflicting 
interests, therefore the status quo remains and the North Korean people suffer. China 
has a direct interest in maintaining North Korea according to David Shambaugh: 
“Preventing collapse is Beijing’s bottom line because collapse would have enormous 
tangible human and economic consequences for China, not to mention the intangible 
political impact of another failed Communist state.”
40
 China’s efforts to maintain 
stability in North Korea currently undermine U.S.-led sanctions against the regime, and 




interest in a stable North Korea. The Kim family has also continually invented new 
ways to support itself, therefore sanctions have done more to harm the people of North 
Korea while the ruling elite remain wealthy. The Republic of Korea does not wholly 
support punitive sanctions against North Korea as was pointed out by David 
Shambaugh: “The PRC and ROK both oppose a punitive approach based on sanctions, 
and neither seems to endorse the Bush administration’s policy of tailored 
containment.”
41
 Sanctions create instability which the DPRK is not lacking. They are 
also generating poverty that will be dumped on their only two land neighbors, China 
and South Korea, if the regime collapses. A military campaign would expedite a 
refugee crisis and could provoke a larger conflict with China. The only two options are 
to maintain the status quo and delay the inevitable collapse of the regime, or to begin 
proactive measures to bring the North up to greater levels of development to reduce a 
future refugee, humanitarian, and economic crisis.  
The big setback to helping North Korea develop is that we would inadvertently be 
feeding its massive military. The DPRK maintains its claim as the sovereign ruler of the 
entire peninsula and would use its conventional forces for such purpose according Bruce 
Bechtol: “This huge army not only maintains itself as a major power broker in the country, 
but it continues to provide the DPRK with the means to achieve their long-range strategic 
goal - to unify or dominate the Korean Peninsula by force.”
42
 This army has been unable to 
achieve such ends due to the strong alliance between the United States and the Republic of 
Korea’s militaries. This has led North Korea to develop its asymmetrical threat capabilities 
which Bruce Bechtol. identified in his book The Last Days of Kim Jong-il: The North Korean 




aggression from North Korea since 1953, the leadership in Pyongyang has had to find a way 
to incite fear, to create tension, and to attempt to undermine the government in South Korea--
and this helps bring North Korea closer to the goal of dominating the Korean Peninsula.”
43
 
The idea of North Korea ruling the whole peninsula may be fantasy but it does possess 
enough military capability to ruin South Korea. Any military actions against the DPRK 
require extreme caution so as not to provoke a catastrophic war that would set the peninsula 
back to its World War Two era conditions. Max Fisher, former writer and editor at The 
Atlantic, stated the risk associated with actions against North Korea in a 2012 article: “The 
North Korean military has made clear that it will over-react to any military provocations, 
making any strike extremely risky as it could slide into full-on -- and potentially nuclear -- 
war.”
44
 The risk of an overreaction has been a real possibility that is taken seriously by 
military planners. The DPRK has a history of exacting revenge through rogue military strikes 
against South Korea and its American counterparts. It is also notoriously patient when it 
comes to planning these attacks, many coming years after the event for which they are 
retaliating. Max Fisher goes on to talk about how few alternatives have been left for the 
North, “The world has already taken so many things away from North Korea, it doesn't really 
have many deterrents left, short of all-out war.”
45
 
The regime has a notorious, and almost comical, pattern of not upholding its end of 
any deal offered to it. According to Max Fisher:  “The U.S. occasionally boosts food aid, 
giving North Korea an incentive to cooperate, but the regime rarely holds to its side of the 
deal and doesn't seem too bothered when the food aid is taken away.”
46
 The ruling elite have 
little concern for the plight of their people, leaving few options for effectively dealing with 




recognize the potential of the regime and its intricate state apparatus for maintaining order 
within North Korean society. Undermining the regime could facilitate a state collapse that 
would dump its starving and impoverished population on the world. Its neighbors, South 
Korea, China, and Japan would no doubt bear the brunt of the humanitarian crisis. The 
alternative draws upon China’s model of development but requires two difficult and 
politically unpopular realities for the United States. One is conceding to a Chinese model, the 
other is recognizing at least some legitimacy of the Kim regime in North Korea. Such 
recognition would undoubtedly be spun by the regime as a great victory and affirmation of its 
legitimacy. However, allowing an influx of trade and investment would expose the North 
Korean population to the world. Doing so would empower the people to question their 
government and press for more quality of life improving concessions. Increased trade 
requires an increase in skilled workers, which would also lead to improved schools. The Kim 
regime currently has no concern for the plight of its people and uses the rest of the world’s 
concerns for human rights to its own advantage. Max Fisher stated it well in a 2012 article 
for The Atlantic, “So North Korea is using its poverty and isolation as its weapons, striking 
out at the world -- sometimes apparently at random -- and building up its "asymmetric 
capabilities" to keep its borders as militarized and tense as possible. This keeps North 
Koreans in, the world out, and Pyongyang's enemies focused on preventing another deadly 
attack.”
47
 This combination of tactics has proven effective for the longevity of the Kim 
regime, and while the rest of the world may look on in disgust, they are currently the only 
apparatus holding the country together and containing the human crisis to within their own 
borders. If the world wants to solve this human crisis without assuming the costs and 




elite. Otherwise it is time to remove the regime and deal with the problems head on. Current 
strategies do nothing more than pass the problem on to future generations who will be left 
with an even greater crisis. In the past, America has supported autocracies where doing so 
advanced its goals and continues the same practice in many areas today. While the United 
States has traditionally been opposed to any communist regime, that form of government has 
proven itself ineffective and is no longer an ideological or existential threat to democracy. In 
fact, much of the world has seen the merits of a liberal democratic system and is increasingly 
moving in that direction. It is not a new idea to support a brutal regime towards the ends of 
development. The United States tolerated a succession of dictators and human rights abuses 
in South Korea’s long march towards becoming a bright spot in the world for development. 
The difference is that some authoritarians and their regimes are cast as enemies while others 
are touted as allies. The difference is almost entirely political spin. After all, enemies mean 
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Chapter V: The Problem with Military Interventions 
 Nations have generally avoided direct military interventions in other countries 
since the Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War in 1648. Hundreds of years 
later, globalization has made interventions relevant again. Hans Günter Brauch notes: 
“Both environmental impacts of military activities and of wars, and the environment as 
a cause or contributing factor to hazards, migration, crises and in the extreme case also 
to conflicts have posed ‘threats’, ‘challenges’, ‘vulnerabilities’ and ‘risks’ that have 
been conceptualised since the late 1980s in the context of U.S. ‘national security’ and 
since the 1990s increasingly also as dangers to ‘human security’.”
1
 Globalized crime 
and terror organizations as well as various human crises brought on by famine and war 
cross borders and create security and stability concerns for other states. Nonintervention 
was built on the premise of respect for a nation’s sovereignty. Larry Diamond identified 
this changing trend: “Over the past two decades, however, traditional notions of 
sovereignty--of ‘nonintervention’ in the internal affairs of other countries--have fallen 
out of favor, while deliberate efforts to promote democracy have flourished.”
2
 
Instability in one region can easily spill over into neighboring countries or cross the 
globe and create problems. Western-style democracy is generally seen as the solution to 
many global issues due to its level of economic success and political stability. Many 
global problems have taken root in less developed former third world countries such as 
Somalia. Piracy around the Horn of Africa, for example, stems from lack of opportunity 
in Somalia and impacts many industrialized countries using shipping routes through the 
area. This creates a need for politicians to ‘do something’ as pressure from businesses 




region’s domestic affairs. Intervention typically refers to foreign military operations in 
the afflicted country. The United States has the power projection capability to conduct 
these operations globally, thereby making military intervention a politically expedient 
solution to global problems. Francis Fukuyama pointed out the opportunity for reform 
generated by a political crisis in his book State-building: Order and governance in the 
21st century: “It often takes a crisis of one sort or another--whether external, like a war 
or pressure from foreign governments, or internal, like a revolution or economic 
collapse--to create the political conditions for major institutional reform.”
3
 The 
justifications and goals of military interventions have been vague since the Vietnam 
War. The end-states and exit strategies for military operations are unclear and the 
operations become less politically popular as their length in time increases. Dean 
Acheson Research Professor of International Relations and Political Science Bruce 
Russet discussed the inability of military interventions to produce democracy in a 2004 
article on the Democratic Peace Theory: “Military interventions have sometimes 
installed democracies by force, but they have more often failed, and the successes have 
been immensely expensive in lives and treasure.”
4
 Still, the United States military is the 
only institution equipped to rapidly respond to crises anywhere in the world. Change 
has been happening globally at an increasing pace, however, so it is time to update 
national strategies to better address the demands of globalization. 
 More developed countries make military interventions from the outside cost-
prohibitive and failing states lacking the resources to resist an invasion lack the internal 
mechanisms for successful transition. Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten, reinforced 




immediate costs of toppling their regimes are low, making them tempting targets. But 
democracy is unlikely to take hold in these states, and the costs of intervention can grow 
astronomically in the wake of regime change because the conditions that hinder 
democratization are also those that increase the likelihood of civil war.”
5
 Such a dynamic 
was a factor in the post-2003 Iraq reconstruction efforts due to the decision to completely 
dismantle the government and remove all members of the Baath. The result was a civil war 
and over a decade of combat operations to stabilize the country. Alexander Downes explains 
how the views of policy makers that influenced the decision to embark upon a military 
intervention in spite of the limited chances of success: “Policymakers in democracies tend to 
be optimistic about the possibility of spreading democracy, but their optimism is not 
supported by the conclusions of most scholarly studies of forceful democracy promotion.”
6
 
The problem is that militaries are designed to destroy and are much less effective as tools for 
creating positive change. The U. S. military is unrivaled in its capabilities and is widely 
viewed as a reliable institution by the American public. This makes it the preferred 
instrument of diplomacy, regime change, and purveyor of democracy. However, this is not 
the purpose for which it is organized. As Alexander Downes and Jonatan Monten explain, 
military interventions fail because “First, simply overthrowing foreign leaders is unlikely to 
enhance democracy, and may actually contribute to chaos and even civil war in target states. 
This is an important lesson given the rise of precision airpower and remotely piloted drone 
aircraft.”
7
 Airpower and drone warfare decrease the number of American lives risked in a 
military intervention, making it a more tempting option for policymakers. Drone warfare has 
proven controversial for many reasons, not the least of which is its tolerance for collateral 




intervention can help uphold or restore a democracy: “A second lesson is that intervention to 
restore democracy in recently democratic countries that have reverted to autocracy—either 
through a coup or foreign occupation—can succeed.”
8
 This situation does not apply to recent 
interventions in non-democratic countries and does not apply to Iran or North Korea. Eva 
Bellin elaborated on a similar point in 2004 and commented “Historical experience suggests 
that although military occupation may increase the likelihood of democratization, and wise 
policy choices certainly improve its chances, the outcome is largely shaped by factors, both 
domestic and international, that cannot be controlled by military engineers operating within 
the confines of current cultural norms and conventional limits of time and treasure.”
9
 This is 
a scenario that became apparent as the U.S. occupation of Iraq dragged on. The Iraqi 
reconstruction project is an extreme scenario that highlights the shortcomings of military 
intervention. It provides an excellent case study for military interventions and inspired this 
research into alternative strategies for aiding stability and inspiring moves towards gradual 
liberal democratic reforms that improve national security for the United States.  
Case Study: The aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq provides a worst-case scenario study of how military 
interventions and operations can go badly. Much discussion has gone into the justifications 
and causes of the second invasion of Iraq. Raymond Hinnebusch, professor of International 
Relations at the University of St. Andrews provided an outsiders view of the decision to 
invade Iraq: “Compared with other wars, there appears to be an especially radical cleavage 
between the justifications for war advanced by its proponents—Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs)—which proved to be hollow, and the actual motives and causes.”
10
 The 




among the international community. Previously it had rallied a multilateral coalition to its 
cause in Afghanistan based on sympathies gained in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the 
realistic threat al-Qaeda created for much of the world.  
Another view is that a small group of neoconservatives drove the United States into a 
prolonged conflict. According to Hinnebusch, “What went wrong from a realist point of view 
was that ‘extremists’ managed to capture US foreign policy and set it on a path at odds with 
the national interest.”
11
 He explains the frightening lack of opposition to the invasion within 
the United States and noted “The view that the war was an aberration faces, however, a hard 
time accounting for the utter absence of opposition in Congress, the silence of the corporate 
world and the ease with which the public was brought to acquiesce in a war that, a short time 
before, had been on nobody’s agenda except for the clique Bush brought to power.”
12
 The 
decision to invade Iraq was made in the wake of the 9/11 attacks at a time when Americans 
were feeling vulnerable and angry. President Bush shaped support early by including Iraq in 
his ‘Axis of Evil’ reference during his 2002 State of the Union address, effectively 
associating Iraq, Iran, and North Korea directly with the Global War on Terror. The decision 
to invade was made quickly and the initial combat operations were over before effective 
political opposition could be rallied, leaving the United States with a failed state in the 
Middle East to manage. Time has proven the 2003 Iraq invasion to be a complete debacle in 
spite of the success of the 2007-2011 troop surge (reversed by domestic politics). Pursuing a 
similar strategy against Iran or North Korea is unnecessary. It would be wiser to work with 
their current ruling institutions to more gradually and effectively instigate reform. 
The aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq damaged the reputation and credibility of 




justifications for the invasion, but this section focuses on the lessons learned from 
reconstruction efforts. It will focus on the de-Ba’athification policy that removed any and all 
Saddam supporters and left the country entirely without leadership. Andrew Flibbert 
observed: “After taking the country by force in 2003, the United States disbanded the Iraqi 
military, dismantled its bureaucracy, transformed its legal system, and replaced its leadership 
from top to bottom. The result was a brutal and multi‐headed insurgency, ongoing terrorism, 
economic stagnation, crumbling infrastructure, rampant criminality, sectarian and ethnic 
polarization, and low‐grade civil war.”13 The decision, designed to remove a major source of 
contention in Iraq, inadvertently lead to a civil war in Syria and the rise of a new terrorist 
group with visions of establishing a renewed Caliphate in the Middle East. The Islamic State 
(IS) has emerged as a new threat to U.S. national security, the democratically elected Iraqi 
government, and regional stability. The organization was formed from, and is led by, former 
leaders of the Iraqi military excluded from Iraqi reconstruction efforts. Colonel James R. Hoy 
Jr. argues “Failing to mobilize this manpower for positive use was a major policy mistake. In 
short order the U.S. could have re-assembled the Army and employed it to keep order or 
conduct public works projects. Bremer’s 23 May decree banning the organization stripped 
away a key national institution that could have played an important role in stabilizing the 
country.”
14
 Andrew Flibbert made a similar observation: “The short, regime‐ending war in 
March and April 2003 was directed at Saddam Hussein and his military, but the postwar 
dismantling of the Iraqi state presumed the relative insignificance of state power and 
authority. This was both by design, in the Bush administration’s decision to eliminate 
instruments of oppression like the Iraqi military, and by ideologically prompted inattention, 






 The de-Ba’athification program was extensive and left Iraq without a 
functioning bureaucracy, a void the U. S. military was not prepared to fill. The repercussions 
have clearly manifested themselves in the extreme turbulence of the current situation in the 
Middle East. 
The decision to pursue de-Ba’athification was based on the reconstruction efforts in 
Germany following the Second World War. Colonel Hoy reiterated this point and declared 
“In an effort to understand this current reconstruction mission many turn to historic examples 
of occupation for insight. Invariably the American experience in de-Nazification is viewed as 
a model for success.”
16
 There were numerous other factors that contributed to the overall 
success of German reconstruction, not the least of which was Germany’s preexisting 
industrial and political experience combined with large influxes of foreign capital and 
security efforts. De-Nazification was little more than a political show at the end of the war. 
Furthermore, Germany had exhausted its resources and the political will of the Nazi party by 
the end of combat operations as explained further by Colonel Hoy: “In many ways Germany 
was effectively de-Nazified through the impact of five years of devastating war, six million 
deaths, and Hitler’s failure to provide security and prosperity. Still the success of America’s 
largest reconstruction effort certainly looms large as a model for our occupation effort in 
Iraq.”
17
 Ultimately, many former members of the Nazi party were allowed to return to 
positions within the German bureaucracy due to their competence in running the country. 
The process in Iraq was less forgiving, due to an exponential increase in media coverage that 
would likely have generated political backlash at the inclusion of Ba’ath party members and 




The process of de-Ba’athification was extensive in Iraq. According to Colonel Hoy, it 
even extended into the economic realm as “De facto economic de-Ba’athification tends to 
blacklist companies that did business with Saddam’s regime, further stifling the few outlets 
for progress.”
18
 Iraq was starved of its bureaucracy and income, conditions that led quickly to 
anarchy and civil war as millions of displaced and unemployed citizens were left without 
basic goods and services and no clear direction, factors that an intact bureaucracy and semi-
functioning economy could have reduced. Instead, the U.S. military was left entirely in 
charge of maintaining order in Iraqi society. Muslim nations, like many others, are not keen 
to rule by foreign militaries, a reality that decreased the chances for success. Military 
occupation can be interpreted as imperial intentions and plays directly into the motives of 
rising authoritarians and warlords whose power depends directly on their ability to resist 
foreign occupiers. Colonel Hoy summed up the damage caused by de-Ba’athification: “With 
a party membership of 2 million citizens, a strict policy denies the nation the critical talents 
that previously allowed the country to function. The de-Ba’athification Order has crippled 
health services, education, and security.”
19
 The de-Ba’athification policy was ideologically 
driven and ignored the realities of state-building and post-war reconstruction efforts. Much of 
the optimism going into Iraq was driven by the success of the reconstruction efforts in 
Germany and Japan following the Second World War. 
The realities of both reconstruction efforts were largely ignored going into Iraq. It 
may be that optimism blinded policy makers and much of the American public to the true 
scope and difficulties faced in both scenarios. Jonathan Monten explains a key difference: “In 
contrast with the Japanese occupation, where the purges were narrower in scope and attempts 




deeper—it applied to a broader range of government officials and at greater levels in the 
bureaucracy. The result severely weakened Iraqi national political institutions.”
20
 The cases 
of Japan and Germany will be evaluated later in this paper, but the key difference is that their 
bureaucracies were left largely intact. It is a topic that lacks media appeal, but it is crucial to 
understand the importance of high-functioning bureaucracies as not only an instrument of 
stability but as a network which can reliably implement reforms. Bureaucrats know how to 
deliver services and provide continuity to the daily lives of citizens. Future operations ought 
to tap bureaucracies as a resource to implement new policies of reform. 
Preemptive/preventive military overthrow of Iran or North Korea is not an 
option 
Extensive research has gone into explaining the justifications of the 2003 Iraq 
invasion and plenty of discussions exists concerning whether it was right or wrong. The 
major lesson to take away is that such a full-scale military overthrow is an ineffective means 
for establishing democracy. In the case of Iraq, it actually decreased regional stability and 
increased Iranian and North Korean incentive to pursue asymmetric warfare capabilities and 
nuclear weapons as a defensive measure against invasion. The ‘Axis of Evil’ speech set back 
progress in the relationship between the United States and Iran and damaged what little 
rapport existed between the United States and North Korea at the time. Mahmood 
Sariolghalam put it simply: “The United States should avoid military solutions to settle its 
differences with Iran, as military strikes on Iran would delay rapprochement for many years 
to come.”
21
 The threat of a larger scale war exists with any military actions. The Asia-Pacific 
region is particularly sensitive to this phenomenon that hinders any military strike against 




Mochizuki, professor of political science at George Washington University discussed the 
repercussions of a strike against North Korea nuclear reactors: “Any military strike at North 
Korea’s nuclear reactors and plutonium reprocessing facilities at its Yongbyon site north of 
Pyongyang would be extremely risky in light of the possibility that a larger war would 
result.”
22
 A strike against North Korea has the potential to drag the United States into a much 
larger scale conflict. Military strikes are off the table as a tool of coercion against North 
Korea, a fact of which Pyongyang is keenly aware. 
A strike against Iran would be devastating to regional stability in the Middle East. It 
is the last remaining stable state in a chain that stretches from Syria to Pakistan. In short, the 
United States needs Iran to maintain regional stability. A military strike would be a strategic 
misstep. Further, while Iran has dissidents and moderates, many are willing to rally behind 
their government when facing external threats. Military saber-rattling alienates these groups. 
Mahmood Sariolghalam explained the heightened difficulty associated with a direct attack 
against Iran and noted “Iran is not Iraq, and if the current disarray in post-Saddam Iraqi 
society is at all alarming, Iranians are far more prepared to defy foreign rule and are 
passionate about doing so.”
23
 Iran’s anti-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric is of concern to 
many and provides adequate media fodder for anti-Iranian and pro-Israel lobbies, but is 
topical in nature. It serves the purpose of appealing to hard-liners and for the leadership to 
maintain its legitimacy since it has built much of its platform on both. Iranians understand the 
repercussions of war, especially against the United States, and thus seek to avoid it. Yet they 
are also motivated to increase their role as a regional power, which requires the expansion of 
military capabilities. As Mahmood Sariolghalam explained, “Careful observation of Iranian 




incremental change should guide all attempts at reform, and that foreign military intervention 
would be costly for Iran.”
24
 Strategic patience is paramount when dealing with the Middle 
East, as well as their sensitivity to foreign intervention. There is no reason to tear down the 
political institutions Iranians have already constructed. The same holds true for North 
Korea’s complex bureaucracy.  
Nuclear weapons, while egregious, are defensive in nature and nuclear-armed states 
have an interest in maintaining control of their nuclear technology and not allowing it to fall 
into terrorist hands. Pakistan has managed to accomplish that even if little else. Preemptive or 
preventive strikes against nuclear plants would only set back diplomacy, increase rivalry, and 
reduce future chances of liberal democratic reform. A full-scale military strike against the 
ruling institutions, and purges akin to de-Ba’athification in Iraq would eliminate the channels 
that would implement such changes. As Samuel Huntington stated in his 1968 book Political 
Order in Changing Societies, “Authority has to exist before it can be limited, and it is 
authority that is in scarce supply in those modernizing countries where government is at the 
mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and rioting students.”
25
 His 
statement holds true today and is strengthened by the current state of disarray throughout the 
Middle East left by the invasion and failed reconstruction efforts in Iraq. A smarter approach 
that builds on existing institutions would net liberal democratic gains that would increase 
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Chapter VI: Successful Democratic Transitions 
The case studies of post-World War II reconstruction efforts in Japan and Germany 
are often used as a benchmark for success with which to measure subsequent efforts. Both 
were unique cases, however, in which the lessons learned do not readily translate into success 
for most modern cases. The failed reconstruction effort in Iraq started with optimism derived 
from the successful democratic transitions of Japan and Germany. Some observers claimed 
that surely an America with an even greater military capacity and much larger economy than 
what it had at the end of World War II could easily repeat a successful democratic transition 
in Iraq. As Eva Bellin wrote, “Democracy cannot flourish in a context of chaos, as countless 
cases of failed democratization from Haiti to Somalia have shown. Here, too, Iraq is sorely 
disadvantaged in its quest for democratization when compared to the cases of Japan and 
Germany.”
1
 Post-invasion Iraq did not exist in the same context as Japan or Germany at the 
dawn of their reconstruction efforts. Japan and Germany had well-established political and 
bureaucratic cultures, diversified and heavily industrialized economies, and a high degree of 
national solidarity. As Francis Fukuyama stated, “Both Germany and Japan were both very 
strong bureaucratic states long before the United States defeated them; indeed, it was the 
strength of their states that led them to be great powers and threats to the international system 
in the first place.”
2
 The reconstruction efforts in Japan and Germany were exactly that, 
reconstruction. Both states were rebuilt on a foundation of existing institutions that were used 
to implement democratic reforms.  
The total costs of Japanese and German reconstructions were reduced by their 
preexisting state structures. According to a 2006 Congressional Research Service report, 




inflation) provided to Germany — and almost double that provided to Japan — from 1946-
1952.”
3
 The costs of the first three years of Iraqi reconstruction already significantly 
outpaced the costs of rebuilding Japan and Germany. Twelve years later the country is still 
unstable and significantly lacks the power, structure, and resources it once had under Saddam 
Hussein, which still remained far behind that of Japan or Germany in the first half of the 
twentieth Century. So in 2003 the United States removed a dictator believed to be stockpiling 
WMDs, purged all of his supporters and subsequently the bureaucratic know-how of the Iraqi 
state, and tried to establish democracy in an already fractured country with no history of 
national unity or democratic governance.  
Another important point is the expectations of reconstruction. The same 2006 report 
singled out this fact: “Countries today have much higher expectations of what the United 
States should contribute to reconstruction in Iraq relative to what was expected following 
World War II.”
4
 Japan and Germany were defeated at the end of the largest scale conflict the 
world has experienced. Their resources and national will were exhausted and both readily 
accepted the terms of defeat. Their populations expected the reconstruction efforts that 
followed and did not resist the occupying militaries at the end of the war. Both Japan and 
Germany had the national strength to invade, defeat, and dominate large swaths of territory 
while Iraq in 2003 struggle to mount a semblance of self-defense. Iraq had exhausted its 
military capacity fighting Iran in the 1980s and with its defeat in the first Gulf War followed 
by a decade of enforced no-fly zones and sanctions.  
In fact, it was Iraq’s lack of military capacity and national strength that led Saddam to 
pursue WMDs in the first place. He no longer had the conventional forces to defend himself 




a sense of nationalism and much of their political and industrial experience. Both had strong 
foundations on which to rebuild. Eva Bellin summed up the difference: “In short, both Japan 
and Germany had crucial political institutions, practices, and habits of mind to call upon 
when building their new democracies in the postwar period. The same cannot be said of 
Iraq.”
5
 The existing Iraqi state was loosely stitched together and administered by the British 
at the end of World War I. It lacked the long history and unified national identity that existed 
for centuries in Japan and for close to a century in Germany where a unified state was formed 
because the many microstates already shared a similar identity, history, culture, and 
language. Much the opposite is true of Iraq where a tribal culture divided along ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, and cultural lines exists. The governments of Japan and Germany signed 
formal declarations of defeat to end World War II. “And although the war devastated much 
of the physical capital in both countries, Japan and Germany retained the human, 
organizational, and social capital (that is, skilled workers, skilled managers, and social 
networks) that is the lynchpin of economic development,”
6
 according to Eva Bellin. Saddam 
Hussein and much of his Ba’ath supporters either hid or fled Iraq during the 2003 invasion, 
leaving the country leaderless. The anarchy created a vacuum that left Iraq wide open for 
insurgency at a time when groups such as al-Qaeda were desperate for a new battleground on 
which to fight the United States. The power vacuum combined with the scope of 
development and state-building required by the Iraqi state, and the insurgency supported by 
outside forces left the United States in a difficult position. The Bush administration had 
conducted the invasion of Iraq on the premise of stopping Saddam Hussein from acquiring 




failure. Democracy, as explained by Bruce Russett, became the Bush administration’s answer 
to resolving the crisis:  
Certainly their postwar policy was built on the principle that the former 
German and Japanese governments could never have been peaceful, and that 
democratization of their systems was essential. To this end they devoted 
enormous material and intellectual resources (for Germany alone more than an 
order of magnitude in dollars than any subsequent effort). Their success 
served as an example to those in the Bush administration who hoped to 




The fact that the Iraqi government disintegrated under the U.S. invasion left responsibility for 
its reconstruction, due to the largely unilateral decision to invade, almost entirely on the 
United States. Optimism generated from the successes of Japan and Germany made any 
reconstruction effort an afterthought to invasion planners. Reconstruction planning may have 
been simplified in their thinking as something that simply required a large application of 
money and resources, a task the most powerful country in the world could relatively easily 
manage. The reality is that state-building is much more difficult to achieve and that Japan 
and Germany are poor examples because they were already well-developed states before any 
reconstruction efforts took place. More modern state-building enterprises tend to take place 
in poorly developed, weak, or failed states that lack the necessary ingredients for success. 
Those states that are candidates for liberal democracy already have well-established and 
legitimate governments typically with strong militaries capable of engaging in the kind of 
prolonged warfare between states that is unacceptable to the international community. The 
lessons learned from the following case studies of Japan and Germany show that certain 
levels of institutional development are necessary before any truly liberal democracy can be 
established. Even the United States was formed by people with an established pattern of 




Case Study: Reconstruction of Japan 
Japan’s successful reconstruction was largely a result of its prior level of 
development. The reconstruction of Japan started after its formal surrender aboard the USS 
Missouri in the summer of 1945. General Douglas MacArthur was given unilateral authority 
to conduct the reconstruction efforts. The Japanese mainland had been heavily bombed 
during the war but much of its government infrastructure remained intact. MacArthur sought 
to use the existing infrastructure to implement reforms and reconstruction projects. Many of 
the ideas on state authority and how to use it were influenced by Great Depression-era 
thinking in the United States according to Jonathan Monten: “New Deal ideas about state-
building also heavily influenced the U.S. democratization agenda in Japan. At both the 
planning and implementation stages, U.S. officials sought to use the power of the state to 
advance democratic reform.”
8
 These ideas were possible only because the Japanese state had 
preexisting institutions capable of governing. It also maintained legitimacy, largely due to the 
decision to keep Emperor Hirohito in place while limiting his power. He served as a 
figurehead of the Japanese people and gave credibility to reforms and programs implemented 
by MacArthur. According to Christopher Coyne, “[J]apan had a highly industrialized 
economy with the requisite knowledge of the relevant production, organizational, and 
management techniques.”
9
 This knowledge meant that what Japan really needed to rebuild 
were an influx of resources, most of which had been exhausted by the war effort. Democracy 
and land reform were imposed as a means to preventing the Japanese from another attempt at 
imperial expansion.  
By 1945 Japan already had a centuries-old history. It was a culturally homogenous 




the west, it eventually saw the need to modernize or be conquered by outsiders and embarked 
upon a rapid modernization effort that in itself could serve as a case study in modern state-
building. This period, known as the Meiji Restoration, began in 1868 and both restored the 
emperor of Japan and modernized Japan into an industrial state. During this period Japan 
emerged from the old shogunate system into a state with modern institutions, bureaucracies, 
and industrial capability. These same reforms allowed Japan to become the imperial power it 
was during the war as well as allowed for its rapid return as a modern developed state and 
powerful industrial economy following its defeat. According to Jonathan Monten, General 
MacArthur used this to his advantage during the reconstruction period:  
From the Meiji period in the nineteenth century onward, Japan systematically 
acquired the attributes of the modern, European state. In particular, Japan built 
a highly effective national bureaucracy, led by an efficient, nonpartisan, 
professional class of civil servants. The United States allowed this state 
apparatus to continue relatively unchanged, exemplified by the decision to 




The Japanese government already had a long established legitimacy among the people, and 
this legitimacy remained after the war in-spite of their defeat. MacArthur was able to use this 
legitimacy to conduct the reconstruction effort and implement democratic reforms relatively 
unopposed.  
A modern industrial economy and well-established bureaucracy were not the only 
advantages the Japanese had in 1945 over Iraq in 2003. According to Christopher Coyne, 
“Another important characteristic of Japanese society was the existence of a shared national 
identity.”
11
 Japan is culturally and ethnically homogenous. Minority groups comprise an 
extremely small portion of the population and the Japanese language is strongly consistent 
throughout its borders. Furthermore, Japanese culture stresses conformity and emphasized 




of unity of purpose that has enabled them throughout history to achieve radical 
transformations over short periods of time. General MacArthur was able to use this to his 
advantage when initiating changes through the existing structures.  
The United States faced a dilemma when determining how to manage a defeated 
Japan. The Japanese had provoked the United States to war with their horrific attack against 
the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 7 December 1941. The war effort against Japan 
included the internment of Japanese-Americans, as well as a massive anti-Japanese 
propaganda campaign. Anti-Japanese sentiment was high and the U. S. government had to 
consider whether to punish Japanese leaders responsible for the war or to leave them in place 
and expedite the rebuilding of the country. Jonathan Monten discussed this balance in his 
book: “[T]he U.S. occupation sought to purge the government of individuals associated with 
the previous ruling regime, but not in a way that would risk weakening the underlying 
administrative capacity of the Japanese state.”
12
 One of the most important figureheads in 
Japanese politics was also one of the most hated outside of Japan. Emperor Hirohito, and his 
fate, was the topic of debate among the war victors. General MacArthur recognized his 
importance as noted by Christopher Coyne: “In a series of reports from MacArthur to 
policymakers in the United States, the general noted the importance of the institution of the 
emperor for the maintenance of social order.”
13
 It was a bold and unpopular move that 
greatly increased the effectiveness and speed of the reconstruction effort. According to 
Christopher Coyne, “In other words, the emperor was able to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with solving the coordination problem of shifting from the pre-war order to the 
new postwar order.”
14
 MacArthur was able to achieve “buy-in” from the Japanese population 




economic and humanitarian crisis that resulted from the war, the emperor still enjoyed the 
support of the vast majority of Japanese. The bureaucracy, the Diet (Japan’s parliament), and 
the cabinet were intact, functioning, and prepared to cooperate.”
15
 This proved to be a crucial 
element of reconstruction that minimized the time, effort, and costs on the part of the United 
States and ultimately lead to Japan’s rise as a democracy. The successful reconstruction 
helped Japan become one of the United States’ top trading partners and a key element of the 
Asia-Pacific security strategy. Had the Emperor been subjected to punishment or execution, 
instead of simply having his executive power limited, the Pacific theater might look quite 
different today. 
Lessons Learned 
There are important lessons to be learned from the occupation of Japan; many of the 
lessons were not applied to Iraq. Jonathan Monten discussed the indecision to form a formal 
occupation authority: “In contrast with the Japanese occupation, Bush administration 
decision-makers also, at least initially, rejected the idea of creating a formal occupation 
authority that would wield sovereignty in Iraq, and instead formed the ORHA under a retired 
general, Jay Garner.”
16
 The ORHA he refers to is the Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Assistance. The decision may have been influenced by a desire to avoid 
imperial connotations and avoid appearing as conquerors to the Iraqi population. This makes 
sense because Iraq had never actually attacked the United States and there was not a 
prolonged war effort. The problem with ORHA, as Jonathan Monten stated, is that it did not 
wield sovereignty in Iraq. This created a problem when coupled with the decision to purge 
Iraq of Ba’ath Party members. As explained earlier and discussed by Jonathan Monten, “A 




bureaucratic capacity of the Japanese state, limit the purge of individuals who were 
associated with prewar nationalism but nonetheless held critical institutional knowledge, and 
channel state power toward promoting social and economic reform.”
17
 The purging of Ba’ath 
Party members in Iraq left the country in a state of anarchy. Many military leaders, who 
could have been used to rebuild Iraqi security forces and fight or even prevent the 
insurgency, fled the country and aided in the formation of the Islamic State militant group 
that now plagues the region. Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath Party, no matter how 
antagonistic, were the only institution holding the fragile country together prior to the 
invasion.  
In viewing the success of the Japanese occupation and the failure of the Iraqi 
occupation, one may make the conclusion that reforming government institutions and 
improving development is a better method for spreading liberal democracy. As Christopher 
Coyne noted, “If citizens do not view constructed, or reconstructed, institutions as being 
credible, they will fail to make the investment necessary to make such institutions self-
enforcing over time.”
18
 This was exactly the case in Iraq. Many Iraqis celebrated the initial 
ouster of Saddam but soon changed their tone when the realities of the anarchy caused by the 
inadequate planning by the United States set in. The ensuing insurgency fed off 
dissatisfaction over the failure of basic public services and goods as well as the Muslim 
disdain for foreign occupiers in their homelands.  
Anti-Saddam sentiment in the United States developed over a decade of belligerence 
and anti-U.S. rhetoric from Saddam. His claims of having WMDs and refusal to work with 
United Nations weapons inspectors at a time when Americans were feeling vulnerable made 




United States was generated by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as explained by James 
Dobbins, “Because of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the perceived ferocity of the 
subsequent war in the Pacific, there was substantial anti-Japanese sentiment among the U.S. 
public, particularly toward the emperor.”
19
 Overcoming negative sentiments toward 
unpopular figureheads is one of the great challenges facing future democratizing efforts. 
Figureheads such as Khamenei and Kim Jong-Un serve as a focal point of rage for outsiders 
but also serve as a unifying force within their own constituencies. It will take great political 
savvy to reduce their power while retaining them, along with others, as important figureheads 
and perhaps allowing them to be branded as champions of reform. More important are the 
state bureaucracies, especially in Iran and North Korea where they are reasonably developed. 
As Jonathan Monten pointed out from the occupation of Japan, “Instead of dismantling the 
Japanese state, the occupation preserved and channeled it toward a series of social and 
economic reforms designed to promote a wider distribution of wealth, an expanded middle 
class, and greater social pluralism. These policies all created the conditions for sustainable 
liberal democracy in Japan once sovereignty was transferred to an elected government.”
20
 
The Japanese example can be applied to a culturally and ethnically homogenous state such as 
North Korea with a strong central government, although, many other factors present in Japan 
prior to its reconstruction are not present in North Korea. It still, however, has some 
industrial capacity and knowledge to build upon. The key is to develop those capacities in 
advance of any reform or regime change. 
 The presence of U.S. troops is another issue associated with occupations that creates 
aggravation among the occupied. James Dobbins wrote about MacArthur’s sensitivity to this 




had been calling for a peace treaty since 1949 because they believed that the continued 
presence of U.S. forces in Japanese towns and cities served as an irritant rather than a force 
for stability.”
21
 Using U.S. troops to occupy Iran or North Korea, both with long histories of 
strong anti-American sentiment, simply will not work. It would give cause to potential 
insurgents who would sabotage any operations to gain power and tarnish the reputation of the 
United States.  The reconstruction efforts in Iraq proved this to be a powerful force that is 
extremely difficult to overcome. It would be much easier to coerce states into reforms 
without applying such irritants.  
 In the end, the occupation of Japan was successful due to two primary factors; the 
strength of preexisting institutions, and the decision to tap those institutions. James Dobbins 
explained the phenomenon, “Despite the absence of a long democratic history and the 
existence of an authoritarian culture, nation-building in Japan was successful. The speed and 
relative ease of the Japanese transformation had two primary causes: the U.S. decision to co-
opt Japanese institutions and the unilateral process of nation-building.”
22
 Unilateralism 
worked in the case of Japan because MacArthur was able to use the Japanese government 
and because the population as a whole was ready to accept their defeat and the consequences 
of that defeat. However, it was not without drawbacks as James Dobbins explains, “[T]he 
decision to absolve the emperor in whose name the war was fought of all responsibility 
leaves the Japanese today somewhat less reconciled with their history, less ready to admit 
their war guilt, and consequently less reconciled with their neighbors than are the 
Germans.”
23
 Tensions remain in the Asia-Pacific over the war. The Japanese did considerable 
damage to the surrounding countries that remain a source of nationalistic contention between 




was quite different. Germany is fully integrated into European society and is well-reconciled 
with its neighbors. The next section discusses the drastically different style of reconstruction 
that took place in Germany following their official defeat at the end of World War II.  
Case Study: Reconstruction of Germany  
The occupation of Germany was much different from Japan. It was a multilateral 
effort that left the country divided between East and West for decades; however, its ultimate 
success can also be attributed to its prior levels of development. The multilateral effort had 
innate complications due to the difficulty of reconciling the differing objectives of the 
occupiers. Christopher Coyne explained that “In contrast to the case of Japan, where 
MacArthur had unilateral control of the occupation, agreement between the various Allied 
countries was required for designing and implementing broad and general policies that 
affected all zones in Germany.”
24
 Reaching a consensus between states is a complicated 
process. Each had been impacted differently by the war. France had been occupied and 
controlled by the Nazis, Great Britain had been heavily bombed by the Luftwaffe, and the 
United States had entered the European theater of war to aid its allies and suffered little 
damage to the homeland by the Nazis. Pressure to counter increasing pressure from a Soviet 
Union with motives very different from those of the western allies was also a major factor 
that influenced the reconstruction effort.  
Germany quickly became central to the Cold War standoff between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. However, like Japan, Germany had preexisting institutions that 
provided a solid foundation for state-building and democratization. Christopher Coyne 
further explained, “Germany was an industrialized country with well-developed economic, 




occupation of the country.”
25
 These institutions were used in West Germany to build a 
democracy while East Germany was relegated to being a Soviet client state. Also like the 
Japanese, the Germans had been thoroughly defeated in the war and its citizens were 
accepting of their fate at the hands of their occupiers.  
Economic recovery and democratization became a top priority throughout Western 
Europe as a way to counter Soviet expansion. Then Secretary of State George C. Marshall 
came up with a plan to boost western European recovery using a large influx of aid from the 
United States. West Germany was the focal point of his plan, but it eventually encompassed 
most of Western Europe as well. The war devastated Germany and left much of its 
population jobless, homeless, and starving. Therefore, much of the aid targeted meeting basic 
human needs, as the 2006 congressional report explained: “The entire amount of Marshall 
Plan aid is usually considered economic reconstruction funding, even though much of the aid 
provided, in the first year particularly, was foodstuff to feed workers whose productivity was 
compromised by malnourishment. (The severe winter of 1946-1947 in Europe made hunger a 
greater problem at that point than it was right at the end of the war and made apparent the 
need for increased food and other assistance.)”
26
 West Germany was vulnerable, and 
although the Soviet Union had been an ally and essential factor in defeating the Nazis, the 
Soviets used the opportunity to expand and establish buffer states. Tensions quickly escalated 
into the Cold War once the common enemy had been defeated. The Communist threat lent 
urgency and credibility to reconstruction plans. The reconstruction of Western Europe and 
Germany was the beginning of the decades-long showdown between the United States and 






The severity of the war in Europe, the scope of its impact, the totality of the Germans 
defeat, and mounting tensions between the Western allies and the Soviet Union generated a 
powerful urgency to the reconstruction effort. The keys to its success, however, were the 
Germans’ political organization and their well-established economic and industrial 
experience. As Christopher Coyne explained, “Similar to the circumstances in Japan, in spite 
of the fact that the war had caused physical destruction to much of the infrastructure of the 
country, the existing endowment of skills, knowledge, and the art of association was 
conducive to the establishment of liberal democratic institutions in the postwar period.”
27
 
The key to the Marshall Plan was providing the Germans with food and raw materials that 
they then used to rebuild their own country. There was no insurgency in Germany, in spite of 
the differing outside influences of their occupiers. German citizens all had a stake in the 
success of their country. Germany also had an established tradition of democracy, Hitler was 
elected after all. Iraqi citizens tried to rebuild but were easily divided along tribal and 
religious lines. The Iraqis were much more vulnerable to outside influencers such as Iran and 
al-Qaeda than the Germans in 1945 were to the Soviet Union, United States, France, and 
Great Britain. The fact that the Germans were able to conquer much of Europe is a testament 
to their level of political organization and industrial development. Saddam Hussein, on the 
other hand, was barely holding the Iraqi state together. It quickly fractured under pressures of 
invasion. Much of the success of the German reconstruction can be credited to its citizens 
according to Christopher Coyne, “Although a military government was established, occupiers 
largely relied on indigenous citizens and grassroots support for democracy and self-




associated with achieving credibility.”
28
 The ability and willingness of Iraqi citizens to 
quickly organize into a democracy was grossly overestimated. They lacked the established 
capacity to do so in-spite of their willingness to participate in the election process.  
Liberal democracy is the direction much of the world is already moving. Trying to 
force it through military campaigns will only set it back. As Christopher Coyne wrote, 
“Indeed, the German reconstruction should be seen less as an exercise in imposing liberal 
institutions and more as an exercise in overseeing emergent indigenous institutions of self-
government.”
29
 The reconstruction effort would never have succeeded if Germany were not 
already a well-developed country with a unified population who identified with German 
nationality. Any country exhibiting such factors in this day is not likely to be targeted unless 
they become aggressive. Iraq displayed aggression against Iran in the 1980s and Kuwait in 
the early 1990s, but after a decade of war with Iran and a crushing defeat by the United 
States in the first Gulf War, Iraq no longer had the capacity to engage in such aggression. 
Saddam Hussein’s WMD feint was designed to keep himself in power and it backfired.  Iraq 
in 2003 was nowhere near the level of development in Germany in 1945. That combined with 
the decision to remove what state-forming capacity it had through de-Ba’athification, and the 
invasion happening at a time when America was at war with al-Qaeda, doomed the 
reconstruction of Iraq to failure. It is easy to infer from the victory over an enemy such as the 
Nazis that no future task is too big for the United States, but this simply is not true. As 
Christopher Coyne pointed out, “In short, even if aid was indeed a major factor in the 
successful reconstruction of West Germany, that success does not imply that injecting aid 




endowment of skills, culture, and knowhow will vary across cases.”
30
 This is a crucial lesson 
for policy makers to understand before getting into another Iraq-like situation. 
Conclusion 
 Both Germany and Japan were rebuilt under similar circumstances. Both had well-
developed institutions that allowed them to become global powers in the first place. 
Reconstruction was a matter of tapping into those institutions while reforming them so that 
neither country would attempt regional conquest again while allowing both to become 
industrial leaders in the free world. The other is that the circumstances of the war and the 
totality of their defeat were extreme. Both were an existential threat to many states 
throughout the world and therefore had to be defeated for survival. Expectations of the 
victors were quite different due to circumstances as well, as stated in a 2006 Congressional 
report, “Germany and Japan had both declared war on the United States and during at least 
the first year after World War II, U.S. policymakers were inclined to provide only a survival 
level of food and other assistance to its defeated enemies in order to avert starvation and 
prevent massive outbreaks of disease.”
31
 Iraq up until 2003 was merely a nuisance to the 
region. The country lacked the cohesion and capacity to dominate the Middle East. An 
important lesson learned from this case study is that the strength and capability of a state’s 
bureaucracy is an important metric for its potential for reform. As Francis Fukuyama stated 
in his book, “A critical issue facing poor countries that blocks their possibilities for economic 
development is their inadequate level of institutional development. They do not need 
extensive states, but they do need strong and effective ones within the limited scope of 
necessary state functions.”
32
 Iraq was a weak state that was reduced further through the de-




invasion. Furthermore, the war was short-lived and did not initially lead to the prolonged 
suffering of the Iraqi people. Another point that was identified in the 2006 Congressional 
report was that “Democracy-building became the primary objective of U.S. assistance to Iraq 
very early in the occupation, as no caches of biological and chemical weapons were found. 
Unlike the cases of Germany and Japan, there was no massive humanitarian crisis requiring 
aid in Iraq.”
33
 Instead, aid programs focused on providing security and building state capacity 
almost entirely from nothing. This added to the sense of imperialism felt by the Iraqi people 
against the United States, an important factor that was used by insurgent leaders to further 
destabilize the already fragile country. Future stability and security efforts ought to focus on 
increasing development and expanding state capacity where it is inadequate. Globalization 
has brought many positive changes to the word but states are now threatened more by 
international crime, corruption, and terrorism than they are by the expansionist goals of 
neighboring states. It will take organized governments with enforcement capabilities and the 
legitimacy of their constituent populations to control instability and human suffering brought 
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Chapter VII: The Long Game Of Gradual Reform 
 The reconstructions of Japan and Germany took place under extreme circumstances at 
the end of the largest war in history. The international system has developed controls to help 
prevent such an outbreak in the future. The specific conditions that existed in post-World 
War II Japan and Germany are unlikely to be repeated. Instead a much more gradual change 
is more palatable to an international community that prefers stability. This chapter focuses on 
the case studies of South Korea and China and their long road of gradual reforms. South 
Korea emerged from a very poorly developed nation to one of the leading economies and a 
flourishing democracy. China, while still far from democratic, has made strides to improve 
the lives of its citizens and emerged as an industrial power and one of the leading trading 
partners of the United States. The roads to development for either country have not been 
smooth but nonetheless have been much less of a shock to the international system than 
previous case studies. 
 It is easy to attribute the success of both South Korea and China’s stability and 
legitimacy to their economic success. This is not the whole story. As Aurel Croissant, 
Professor of Political Science at Ruprecht-Karls-University and Professor Stefan Wurster at 
the University of Trier stated, “The assumption that good performance does not protect 
against regime failure is supported by the fact that even economically successful autocracies, 
such as South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and Chile, experienced regime crisis and a transition 
to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s.”
1
 The case study of South Korea provides an example 
of separately developing economic capacity and forming a democratic society. Basically, the 
justifications for government actions and policies were routinely called into question as the 




explained it well: “The paradox of East Asian development is that the state is forced to 
reevaluate its raison d'etre upon its success in attaining economic growth.”
2
 In other words, 
the state can use economic growth as justification for its authoritarian policies but is forced to 
reconsider those policies once a certain measure of growth is attained. The other side to that 
point is that economic growth lends credibility and legitimacy to the state, but that legitimacy 
can fail if growth stagnates. In contrast, legitimacy in a democracy is based on obtaining the 
consent of the governed. What happened in South Korea was interesting in that the 
developmental state became less relevant once certain levels of development were achieved. 
According to Eun Mee Kim, “The paradox of South Korean development was that the state 
was forced to reevaluate its raison d'e^tre and to curtail its functions as it successfully 
attained the goal of development.”
3
 South Korea developed in the context of a Cold War 
battleground between the United States and Soviet Union. Economic and democratic 
developments were heavily aided by the United States. Communism, on the other hand, took 
root in China and blended fairly well with China’s long history of authoritarianism. The 
country endured failed policies until economic reforms set it on its current path of rapid 
growth. Its potential as a democracy remains to be seen, but economic reforms have 
improved the quality of life for its citizens and allowed it to become one of the most 
important economic powers in the world. Access to its population of billions, cheap 
manufacturing capacity, and now its enormous market are crucial to the global economy. The 
opening of China’s markets has brought global exposure to its citizens, increased education 
opportunities, and drastically increased the global engagement of the once isolated country. 
The following case studies of South Korea and China evaluate the development of each into 




Case Study: Modernizing South Korea 
South Korea followed a long struggle to modernize into one of the world’s leading 
economies and into a flourishing democracy. It endured war and dictatorships to develop into 
what it is today. As Gregg Brazinsky put it, “Of the numerous places where nation building 
was attempted, South Korea was one of the few to emerge as a wealthy democracy at the end 
of the twentieth century.”
4
 South Korea was a major recipient of U. S. development 
assistance and military protection beginning at the end of World War II and the Japanese 
occupation and lasting throughout the Cold War. Ultimately, however, it was the will and 
determination of the Korean people spurred on by competition with the threatening DPRK 
and their regional rivals in Japan. It is easy to attribute its success to its circumstances and the 
amount of aid received, but ultimately its success was due to the desire of its people to form a 
strong nation. Three primary groups of influence emerged in South Korea’s struggle for 
development according to Eun Mee Kim: “Examination of the South Korean case helped 
identify and explain the roles of three main actors in development: the state, capitalists, and 
labor.”
5
 The three groups repeatedly found themselves in conflict, which was sometimes 
violent. It also served as a sort of interim for balance of power politics within the state. Early 
on the state had the advantage and often brutally cracked down on protests and political 
dissidence. The state also collaborated with capitalists, primarily large business 
conglomerates known as the chaebol, to whom the state channeled much of the foreign aid to 
spur economic growth. The state also kept labor cheap to develop an export-based economy 
of cheap finished goods. Labor eventually was able to organize and fight for reforms to 
improve wages and working conditions. The state and the capitalists brought economic 




South Korea’s development started from almost nothing. It was an impoverished 
vassal state of Japan that developed into a culturally vibrant, politically active, and 
economically powerful nation. Eun Mee Kim, Pil Ho Kim, and Jinkyung Kim, identified the 
relevance of South Korea’s development: “Broadly speaking, South Korea’s development 
can be relevant for countries faced with the triple challenge of extreme poverty, lack of 
democratic governance, and fragile security.”
6
 All three are problem areas in regions 
considered threats to global stability. Unfortunately, many of these areas lack the national 
will the South Koreans had throughout their development.  
The early authoritarian regimes of South Korea were tolerated by the United States 
because they were viewed as more stable and capable of resisting the aggression of North 
Korea. Chung-Sok Suh and Seung-Ho Kwon characterized the attitude of the international 
community during the Cold War toward South Korea: “During the Cold War era, the 
international environment favoured the Korean developmental state because the prosperity of 
Korea in particular was important to the United States.”
7
 North Korea was heavily supported 
by the Soviet Union, which in turn led to a developmental race on the Korean Peninsula that 
influenced decisions and attitudes regarding South Korea. Gregg Brazinsky identified the 
underlying belief of U.S. planners and noted “U.S. officials believed that, by providing the 
right kinds of resources, they could stimulate economic development and democratization in 
regions where neither of these phenomena had made significant inroads”
8
 The success of 
South Korea has proven difficult to replicate in other regions. One of the contributing factors 
to its success was the persistence of engagement by the United States who refused to 
ostracize the emerging state due to its strategic importance. The threat of takeover by 




the South. As Chung-Sok Suh and Seung-Ho Kwon stated, “Internally, the division of the 
country between the communist north and capitalist south gave legitimacy to the military 
dictatorship in the south.”
9
 The South Korean dictators were anti-communists and pro-
capitalists, which were the reasons they were tolerated in-spite of their brutal treatment of 
citizens. 
South Korea had a long and difficult road to development. Their path included a full-
scale invasion from North Korea. Leadership changes did not happen smoothly and at times 
were conducted using assassinations and coups. The country, however, remained focused on 
achieving development. Its people were determined to build a country that could gain 
international respect and rival its neighbors in Japan. Internally, its people had many 
conflicting views as to how the country should move forward. The conflicting views of the 
population became a major driver of reform in the later decades of South Korea’s 
development. Chung-Sok Suh and Seung-Ho Kwon explained it well:  
In response to environmental changes and external shocks, successive Korean 
governments have adopted neoliberal and welfare policies selectively while 
retaining developmental capacities and trajectories. This coexistence of 
policies that reflect alternative market economic systems was not a confused 
adoption of conflicting policies; rather, it was a deliberate choice of the 
government, which deployed a flexible policy mix in responding to changes in 
the environment and hence contributed to continuing growth and development 




An important point to remember is that the United States acted as a security guarantor for 
South Korea. 
With the United States providing the bulk of its international security, the South 
Koreans were able to focus on domestic issues. South Korea developed under unique 
circumstances. According to Eun Mee Kim, Pil Ho Kim, and Jinkyung Kim, “As a matter of 




different from that of South Korea in the twentieth century. In the post-Cold War world, 
where authoritarianism is not seen as an alternative, but an utterly immoral system of 
government, it would be extremely difficult for governments to openly pursue such hard 
authoritarian policies as South Korea did during the Cold War era.”
11
 South Korea’s model 
of authoritarian development is not ideal for today’s world, but there are still many relevant 
points that can be applied to current development efforts. One is to encourage domestic 
involvement in the development of the government while focusing aid efforts on 
foundational institutions such as education and industry. The United States also helped build 
the military and a free press, two institutions who often found themselves at odds but 
nonetheless played vital roles in building the country. The key takeaway is continuous 
engagement in spite of setbacks is crucial when promoting development towards 
liberalization and democracy. The United States was often protested as a villain and 
puppeteer in South Korea, and not always liked by South Korean leadership, but continued 
sending development aid and providing military assistance due to the security threat of North 
Korea.  
Case Study: China’s Modernization 
 The People’s Republic of China presents an interesting alternative case study for 
development and security. It is a communist country that has become one of the leading 
trading partners of the United States. It is essential to the U.S. economy yet has committed 
human rights violations such as restrictions on speech, the holding of political prisoners, and 
brutal crackdowns against protesters. U.S.-Sino relations improved drastically after President 
Nixon’s 1972 visit to China. Hongyi Lai, professor at the University of Nottingham, United 




from Deng Xiaoping and later his successors, China has decisively opened up its closed 
economy and steadily integrated with the world market.”
12
 This process fueled China’s rapid 
growth as well as increased its connections with the rest of the globe. The focus of China’s 
government shifted as well, according to Hongyi Lai: “Under the reformist leadership, the 
bureaucracy and the Party apparatus have been transformed from ones that were suited to 
political control and ideological indoctrination to ones that maintain stability, encourage 
rapid economic growth and deliver decent macro-economic management.”
13
 The result has 
been beneficial, and while social reform has not happened in China to an extent more 
palatable to Americans, it is improving.  
 The increased economic performance of China has improved the quality of life for its 
citizens and increased their demands for reforms but not necessarily their demands for 
democracy. According to Jinghai Zheng, Professor at Harbin Engineering University, and 
Liming Wang, Professor of Haiju at Beijing University of Technology: “Long-standing 
issues such as excessive reliance on the state to provide public goods and the omnipresent 
government control of resource industries are largely consistent with China’s record of 
civilization state development in various ancient dynasties.”
14
 Similarly to South Korea, 
China has followed a path of pro-growth authoritarianism that has allowed its economy to 
thrive while maintaining state control. According to Lai, “A single-minded pursuit of high 
growth and refusal to open up the political system are interlocked core features of pro-growth 
authoritarianism.”
15
 This was the case in South Korea, which existed under a much different 





It could be that the state has established legitimacy by connecting itself to economic 
growth, but also may run deeper into the roots of Chinese culture, history, and Confucianism. 
An important point is made by Weiying Zhang, Professor of Economics at the National 
School of Development, Peking University, “The idea market in China is underdeveloped 
and heavily restricted because of the monopoly of the Communist ideologies. Nevertheless, 
Chinese economists and scholars in other social sciences have played important roles in the 
production of new ideas for the reform movement.”
16
 Government restrictions have slowed 
the development of reformist ideas and prevented a buildup of momentum by political reform 
movements. Regardless of government restrictions, democracy does not have a positive 
history in China with the corrupt Chiang Kai-Shek government having been routed by 
Communist forces and exiled to Taiwan. Economic reform may provide a “back door” for 
liberalization and democracy and has at least has opened up communications and dependency 
between states as well as become a common ground for diplomacy to prevail in spite of 
conflicting nationalist objectives of regional powers and the United States in the Asia-
Pacific.  
 Trade relations have been crucial to China’s development and it has assumed a major 
role as a regional power and driver of the Asia-Pacific economy. The advancement of China 
and South Korea have become intertwined, with China passing the United States as South 
Korea’s largest trading partner. According to David Shambaugh: “In 2001, China became 
South Korea’s largest trading partner, surpassing the United States; South Korea is China’s 
third-largest trade partner.”
17
 As a result, the United States has experienced a relative loss of 





Is it wrong for being different from our system? 
The big questions concerning China is whether or not their system of government is 
socially acceptable to the international community, and is it a threat? Like any system it has 
its dissidents, however, its legitimacy is largely unquestioned by the Chinese population. 
Understanding Chinese cultural background may explain their views on government. Jinghai 
Zheng and Liming Wang summarize some key differences between western and eastern 
processes and comment “While religion, capitalism, and national identity underpinned the 
establishment of Western modern democratic institutions, Confucian values, rights to 
property, and ancestry worship formed the basic values underpinning establishment of the 
Chinese civilization state.”
18
 The differing basis of thought influences their views on the 
legitimacy and role of government. Furthermore, they may have less tolerance for sudden 
change than westerners or may simply enjoy the economic growth they have achieved. 
Unfortunately, China still commits human rights violations, a source of friction among its 
people. According to Lai, “The Chinese Communist Party still dominates politics, and the 
policy making process remains largely inaccessible to the public. As a result, the state and 
officials often ignore people’s rights, legitimate interests, due process and relevant laws.”
19
 
In addition, Honggyi Lai explains, “The courts and judges cannot independently make legal 
decisions and are subject to political interference.”
20
 The Chinese government’s lack of 
transparency and lack of an independent court system both act as a major source of domestic 
contention and makes the country unreliable for foreign investors. Such a dynamic restricts 
the upper ranges of China’s growth potential and will likely become a major point of 
contention for Chinese politics. Unrestricted state control may have helped China achieve its 




to Zheng, however, “State control of the means of production hence further enhances the 
concentration of power toward the central government with few checks on the balance of 
power in the governance structure.”
21
 A lack of balance of power eventually leads to internal 
instability. China is already prone to large cathartic outbursts of protests from its population 
who are underrepresented in government according to Lai: “Even though high economic 
growth may increase the level of popular support for the regime, it does not preclude 
outbreaks of popular protests.”
22
 China will eventually have to reform to maintain 
legitimacy; this will likely occur if it reaches a point of economic stagnation.  
In-spite of positive trade relations, mistrust still exists between the United States and 
China, especially concerning both China’s regional ambitions and its nuclear program. 
Development of this relationship is critical to reigning in the nuclear program of North 
Korea. The importance of China (and Russia) in nonproliferation is explained well by 
Richard Cupitt, “As long as neither the Russian nor Chinese government appears set to make 
an immediate challenge against the basic principles or norms of the current international 
system and as long as their compliance is essential for an effective nonproliferation export 
control system, excluding these states from negotiating the rules and procedures of 
nonproliferation export controls will surely produce acrimony and little interest in abiding by 
those rules and procedures.”
23
 Maintaining the balance between accepting China and pressing 
it toward liberal democratic reforms is essential to regional stability. China may never fully 
embrace western-style democracy or it may do so decades into the future. It does serve as an 
example of the progress that can be made through positive engagement over persistent 
sanctions. The United States could have isolated China from much of the global economy 




failed China would be catastrophic in today’s world due to its size, population, resources, and 
geography. 
Lessons Learned: Keep The Bureaucracy Intact 
 The lesson learned from the case studies of South Korea and China is that persistent 
positive engagement achieves greater results toward development, liberalization and 
democratic reform than sanctions. Francis Fukuyama wrote that change needs to come from 
within in order for it to last: “The majority of cases of successful state-building and 
institutional reform have occurred when a society has generated strong domestic demand for 
institutions and then created them out of whole cloth, imported them from the outside, or 
adapted foreign models to local conditions.”
24
 South Korea adapted western institutions to its 
own cultural and national needs, while Maoist China attempted to build their own system. 
The Maoist experiment failed; China began its miraculous rise when it adapted foreign 
economic models to its domestic needs. North Korea has attempted to remain isolated, partly 
through its own designs and partly due to sanctions against it, and it is one of the most 
destitute countries in the world. Engagement, politically, culturally, and economically, with 
the rest of the world is a key to changing conditions within the country. It cultivates a 
diversity of ideas and trade that make countries more robust by making them more readily 
adaptable to change. This process is hampered by sanctions that ostracize whole countries 
from the international community.  
 Healthy states require functioning state institutions that work as the pipelines for 
delivering public goods and services. According to Andrew Flibbert regarding the forced 
state-failure in Iraq, “Without minimally functioning state institutions, domestic governance 






 By that time sectarian violence had fractured the country. Damage from which it 
appears Iraq will never recover, at least not as the complete state the west has tried to create. 
Koreans, in both north and south, already possess a shared identity in spite of ideological 
differences between the two governments. There is potential for a future as a unified state as 
well as separate functioning states if the North can be modernized. 
 The case studies of South Korea and China indicate that a strong developmental 
autocracy is necessary for rapid development. Eun Mee Kim warns, however, that care 
should be taken when attempting to apply this model to the developing world: “[T]he costs of 
rapid development based on a strong developmental state should be carefully weighed before 
this model of growth is adopted by other Third World nations.”
26
 Both South Korea and 
China were fraught with human rights violations throughout their development and China is 
still prone to them. The potential of existing institutions to maintain stability and act as 
pipelines for reform policies should weigh heavily into the decision of how much to tolerate 
and whether or not to apply sanctions or initiate military actions. Former White House 
correspondent Kenneth Walsh predicted the many consequences of U.S. policies:  
Even talk of military action against Iraq could undermine Arab and Muslim 
support in the fight against terrorism and adds to instability in the region. 
Increasing pressure on North Korea could reverse conciliatory moves by 
Pyongyang, such as its 1994 agreement to freeze its nuclear weapons program 
and its 1999 moratorium on testing long-range missiles. And continued 
hostility from Bush could jeopardize Iran's cooperation in efforts to develop a 




The Middle East remains unstable and relations between the United States and Iran, as well 
as the United States and North Korea, remain tense.  
 State-building and peacebuilding efforts are largely undervalued. Policy tends to lean 




Jonathan Monten raised an important question, “how external interveners can balance the 
need to hold regime figures accountable for past crimes or abuses of power, while still 
preserving the institutional knowledge and experience critical to state capacity.”
28
 Iraq 
demonstrates the consequences of dismantling the state, while South Korea and China 
demonstrate what can be accomplished through and by developing state capacity. Neither 
Iran nor North Korea suffers from the afflictions of failed states such as Somalia, where any 
semblance of a unified central government has failed to take root. Francis Fukuyama 
identified a problem with attempting to build a state from nothing: “The international 
community knows how to supply government services; what it knows much less well is how 
to create self-sustaining indigenous institutions.”
29
 Iran and North Korea already possess self-
sustaining indigenous institutions. Iraq had a strong central state, albeit with less potential 
than Iran or North Korea, prior to the 2003 invasion as James Dobbins pointed out: 
“Compared to other cases, such as Kosovo, Somalia, and Afghanistan, Iraq benefits from 
having a strong state capable of imposing order on society.”
30
 A renewed focus on 
peacebuilding efforts, rather than punishment, is necessary for influencing positive changes 
in functioning states. According to Alexander Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Democracies 
may be better off employing nonforceful means—such as foreign aid, development 
assistance, and attempts to build civil society—to bring about a more democratic world.”
31
 
Such policies may seem unpopular among domestic constituents when applied to states that 
commonly use strongly anti-American rhetoric in their political speech but will ultimately 
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Conclusion: Reform Through Constructive Engagement 
 Reform is more likely to happen through constructive engagement. There is a greater 
need than ever for international cooperation on issues impacting human security. President 
Obama recognized that need in his 2010 National Security Strategy: “And without effective 
mechanisms to forge international cooperation, challenges that recognize no borders-such as 
climate change, pandemic disease, and transnational crime-will persist and potentially 
spread.”
1
 Many of these threats have manifested themselves within recent decades. Issues 
such as transnational crime and terrorism have planted roots in weak and failed states 
incapable of preventing such organizations from operating within their borders. Therefore, 
state-building has become a key component of national security. Francis Fukuyama provided 
a succinct definition of state-building: “State-building is the creation of new government 
institutions and the strengthening of existing ones.”
2
 State-building is the proactive 
component of national security that requires the forging of partnerships in the international 
community for the purpose of expanding state capacity to contribute to global security as 
well as U. S. national security. 
 Turning enemies into allies requires a strong focus on the big picture. Leaders must 
avoid being dragged into adversarial relationships by constituents who do not see it. It is easy 
to gain power by “othering” based on the prejudices of a constituency, but there is nothing to 
be gained outside of one’s own position. One of the biggest advantages to fostering positive 
relations is economic gains in the non-zero-sum system that currently exists. Derek Reveron 
and Kathleen Mahoney-Norris recognized such a dynamic and noted “For the United States, 
the economic success generated by developing countries translates into gains from trade and 
investment with those countries.”
3




the exchange of ideas by opening up lines of communication. Zhang Weiying explained how 
this impacted China: “Just as China imported a great deal of technology and equipment 
developed in the West, it has also imported many ideas from the West.”
4
 The flow of ideas 
improves the knowledge bank of how to solve particular problems. Improvements in 
economic standing also impacts people’s stake in their government and influences what they 
demand of their leaders. The interconnectivity and co-dependency may also decrease the 
perception of the other side as a foreign enemy due to an awareness of dependency and 
larger-scale cultural exchanges. Eun Mee Kim pointed out another interesting side-effect to 
creating economic ties: “Various groups that emerge in the process of economic growth 
present different demands to the state. The state is thus challenged to negotiate and bargain 
with major actors. To do this successfully requires more skill and finesse than can be found 
in an authoritarian regime, where the state can simply repress groups and ignore demands.”
5
 
In South Korea, economic ties were one of the factors that aided its transition to democracy. 
China has shown similar results, but its larger size and already well-established single party 
government, and cultural preferences, have inhibited democratic reforms.  
 The countries of the world have experimented with many political ideologies since 
monarchies fell out of favor hundreds of years ago. Differing views and political experiments 
have been the source of mistrust and war between states. Two hundred years of 
experimentation, however, have established certain truths, not the least of which is that 
democracy is the best source of legitimacy. As Francis Fukuyama explains, “Democratic 
countries are often better able to survive economic setbacks because their legitimacy comes 
from democracy itself (e.g., South Korea in 1997-98).”
6
 Democratic governments gain their 




legitimacy is maintained because the leaders are supported by a majority of the people. In a 
liberal democracy, minority groups remain protected in-spite of conflicting views as to who 
should be in charge. Power is more evenly balanced and the government is able to survive a 
changing world through adaptability. 
 The security environment in the post-World War II world has taken on a dynamic 
quite different from previous eras. Interstate conflict is resolved through more peaceful 
means than large scale war since modern technology has rendered war destructive to the 
point where neither side truly wins. Well-developed states integrated into the global 
community are not an existential threat to national security. The threat has shifted to weak 
and failing states according to Christopher Coyne: “It is unlikely, at least in the near future, 
that there will be significant threats from countries that have reached relatively high levels of 
development. Instead, at least in the near term, the main threat appears to be from weak, 
failed, and conflict-torn states or rogue groups within those states.”
7
 Overcoming these 
threats requires interstate cooperation. This cooperation cannot happen if adversarial 
relationships with unpopular regimes are prioritized over cultivating positive ties to the 
countries those regimes represent.  
 North Korea and Iran were promoted to chief rivals of the United States by former 
President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech. Leaders of both states use strong anti-
American rhetoric to strengthen their own grip on power and the United States has 
consistently played directly into their goals by reciprocating the speech and escalating 
military posture. North Korea has mastered this relationship through three consecutive 
generations of Kim leadership. The United States has exhausted sanctions against the regime 




Michael Mochizuki, “[T]he type of limited engagement pursued over the last decade may 
have inadvertently encouraged the DPRK to develop a counterproductive habit of using its 
weapons programs to gain money and diplomatic attention.”
8
 There is no end in sight to the 
stalemate on the Korean Peninsula due to the maintenance of the status quo. Furthermore, the 
possibility of unification is now hindered by the will of the Korean people and the growing 
disparity between North and South. According to O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, however, the 
United States ought to prepare for the possibility of unification: “Unification of the Korean 
peninsula will occur on its own timetable. U.S. decisionmakers cannot wait for Korean 
unification, however, to develop strategies to address its aftermath and to ensure that U.S. 
security interests are protected in that environment.”
9
 Preparation has primarily consisted of 
military operations designed to establish and maintain security in the immediate aftermath 
should a sudden unification occur. There are many scenarios for unification, but the process 
does not have the buy-in of all countries that would be impacted, chiefly the Chinese who are 
more concerned by the possibility of having a failed state as a neighbor. Chinese aid 
undermines sanctions designed to starve the leadership of North Korea. These sanctions 
starve the people of North Korea, while the leadership continues to benefit from its grip on 
the country and its illicit activities. North Korea stands as an example of the logical 
maximum of sanctions, which can be applied to current sanctions regimes against Iran. 
Positive engagement is more likely to influence both internal reform and international 
stability by creating ties that facilitate the exchange of ideas, co-dependency, and diplomacy. 
According to Max Fisher, “The more that North Koreans learn of the outside world's 
comparatively astonishing wealth and freedom, the less interested they seem to be in 
participating in the North Korean system.”
10




and more globally connected than North Koreans and are known to be interested in more 
engagement with the global community. Why not capitalize on it? 
The Big Issue of Overcoming Structural Conditions 
As discussed earlier, preexisting conditions can have a profound impact on the 
outcome of state-building efforts. Yet many attribute its success or failure to the amount of 
time and resources applied to it. As stated by Jonathan Monten, “One of the most prominent 
arguments to emerge in the literature on U.S. state-building is the claim that successful state-
building depends on the level of commitment by the intervener, measured in terms of the 
duration of the operation and the investment of material resources such as manpower and 
aid.”
11
 Believers in this theory often point to the success of the reconstruction efforts in 
Germany and Japan following World War II. Christopher Coyne disagrees, “Post-World War 
II Japan and West Germany are extremely poor points of comparison for these modern 
threats, and employing them as a baseline will generate faulty and inaccurate analyses of the 
potential for success in future reconstruction efforts.”
12
 The case studies of South Korea and 
China serve as better examples of how modern instances of state-building may look as far as 
the amount of time, domestic buy-in, and struggle required to build indigenous institutions 
capable of creating order and security as well as advancing national goals and hopefully 
facilitating liberal and democratic reforms, two related but separable goals. State-craft and 
diplomacy should focus on building and reforming existing institutions within target states. 
Doing so will provide a greater chance of buy-in and legitimacy from the indigenous 
populations. Developing state capacity where there is none, or where it is inadequate, is a 
crucial step toward building a more liberal democratic global community. Jonathan Monten 




view that international actors face barriers to building the scope and strength of the state in 
countries that lack key preconditions such as prior bureaucratic capacity and high levels of 
economic development and social homogeneity.”
13
 Iran and North Korea already have 
bureaucratic capacity and social homogeneity. The United States can improve the security 
environment by engaging both economically. Doing so will spur the development of 
bureaucracies, professional classes, and open the door to reform.  
The lesson of Iraq, Germany, and Japan demonstrates the need for state capacity. In 
Iraq, the bureaucracy may have been too corrupt to be effective in the long-run, but it would 
have been easier to allow it to hold the country together in the invasion’s aftermath and 
reform it later, especially having captured and removed Saddam Hussein. The decision 
completely to dismantle the Iraqi bureaucracy proved to be a bad one. The same will likely 
hold true in Iran and North Korea. As Francis Fukuyama stated, “What only states and states 
alone are able to do is aggregate and purposefully deploy legitimate power. This power is 
necessary to enforce a rule of law domestically, and it is necessary to preserve world order 
internationally.”
14
 Liberal democracy is ideal, and likely the direction much of the world is 
headed, but that ideal for many may take decades of foundational development before it 
begins to become a reality. Even then, the expectation that countries will resemble the 
American political ideal is unlikely. Each culture will apply its own unique influences to 
create the government that suits its needs.  
Democracy faces another challenge in the world. Many countries, including the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, are democracies in name but little else. North Korea 
has been under dynastic rule since its very beginnings in the late 1940s. As Larry Diamond 




and rules of the political game really do not make it possible, except through extraordinary 
means, to evict the ruling party, coalition, or cabal from power,”
15
 Many ‘democracies’ lack 
the basic freedoms necessary to foster healthy political discourse. Larry Diamond also stated: 
“Freedom to campaign requires some considerable freedom of speech, movement, assembly, 
and association in political life, if not more broadly in civil society.”
16
 If one were to apply 
the Iraq, Germany, or Japanese models of defeat militarily followed by rebuilding, one would 
be forced into a never-ending debate over who is and who is not an acceptable target. It is 
better to focus on institutional development and trade. 
State-building in the form of foreign aid is not without its drawbacks. It risks 
replacing state-capacity rather than aid in developing it. According to Jonathan Monten, “In 
these cases, aid may crowd out domestic capacity-building: national leaders may have little 
incentive to invest scarce resources in improving state capacity in these areas while they are 
being accomplished by international actors.”
17
 For this reason, states with pre-existing 
capacity, or those with the national will to develop, are most likely to become economically 
strong and hold the most potential to become liberal democracies. Other states where 
corruption persists and state leaders work more to obtain their own power and wealth rather 
than serve the interests of their people, are likely to fail regardless of how much aid is applied 
to them. These factors that inhibit development also inhibit the effectiveness of sanctions. 
Fred Hansen and Axel Borchgrevink explained how  “If the leaders of non-democratic 
regimes are more interested in accumulating resources for themselves than in protecting the 
collective good, reduced revenues may fail to change the policies of the regime, while 
leaving even less resources available to the general populace.”
18
 The better way forward is to 




often the case throughout South Korea’s formative years when the United States tolerated 
brutal dictators due to its larger focus on regional security. History has proven that citizens 
will always outlast their leaders.  
Another political trap to avoid is being drawn into conflict by leaders who stand to 
profit from it. Many will use rhetoric and brinksmanship, as well as instigate genocides, in 
order to perpetuate war. James Mittleman explained in in his book Hyperconflict: 
Globalization and Insecurity how: “In executing political violence, some combatants do not 
seek to win a war but to perpetuate it.”
19
 Fear is an easy political device and old ethnic 
rivalries are often the simplest lines along which to divide a community. War also generates 
significant economic opportunities according to James Mittleman, “Levels of military 
spending have escalated and offer sizable economic opportunities. War can provide a cover 
for crime. It begets economic gain for certain international actors, insurgency leaders, as well 
as the holders of state power and their key supporters. Spending by the state is also 
supplemented by remittances from diasporic networks seeking to support those perceived as 
brethren.”
20
 As we have witnessed in the United States, nothing arouses patriotism quite like 
a war.  
Globalization is both positive and negative depending on how it is used. The 
problems facilitated by globalization can also be combatted by it. James Mittleman explained 
the key points: “The larger security challenge is to expand connectivity, which is the way to 
advance peace and prosperity. Key to reducing violence is endorsement of the system of 
security rules for allowing globalization to flourish.”
21
 Exiling states from the global 
community by labeling them as “rogues” or “evil” does nothing to advance security. 




through illicit activities and globalized criminal and terrorist networks. Connectivity is also a 
key to facilitating development. According to Larry Diamond, “With development, the 
quantity and variety of information available explodes, and more important, control over it is 
dispersed.”
22
 Ideas can flourish in the same anarchic environment in which states exist. 
Active measures, such as sanctions, isolate states and their citizens from the rich community 
of information. It is information and desire for a better life that causes citizens to rise up 
against repressive regimes, not economic desolation caused by foreign-imposed sanctions.  
Balancing Foreign Policy with Domestic Politics 
Domestic political needs impact foreign policy. Former President Bush weighed his 
political needs when deliberately labeling Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an “Axis of Evil.” 
He chose his words carefully. Kenneth Walsh explained the reason why: “The war in 
Afghanistan has gone so successfully, he told aides prior to his address, that Americans were 
becoming complacent. Just as important, evidence was piling up at Bush's daily intelligence 
briefings of possible new acts of terrorism, and this had the president worried.”
23
 His speech 
froze diplomatic relations between the United States and all three named countries. It also set 
the United States on the warpath with Iraq. Iran and North Korea may have been targeted 
next had the aftermath of the Iraq invasion not gone so poorly. The complete collapse of the 
Iraqi state was an extreme case that made apparent many lessons in state-building, chief 
among them that democracies cannot simply be installed through military force where there 
is no prior history of healthy state institutions. Second, countries cannot be prepared for 
democratic transitions through decades of sanctions. The Iraqi state had been so 




That stands in sharp contrast to Germany and Japan following World War II where 
reconstruction was a rebuilding process and not seeking to create a state from nothing.  
Countries such as Iran and North Korea should not be ostracized from the 
international community through rogue state politics unless the international community is 
willing to take swift and decisive action against them. Military action against other states is 
not readily accepted by the international community. Taking unilateral actions harms 
international relations and diplomacy. The alternative, sanctions, is not productive for 
building healthy state institutions. Fred Hansen and Axel Borchgrevink explained one of the 
reasons why not: “Sanctions are seen by many as contradicting the concept of ‘partnership’ 
in development. By imposing sanctions, a donor country is stating quite explicitly that it 
knows what is the best policy to follow for the recipient country.”
24
 Sanctions are designed to 
punish unacceptable behavior but have become a politically expedient crutch for ‘peaceful’ 
actions against offending states. They are rarely targeted directly at individual offenders 
within a regime however. Instead, they end up harming the population and relations between 
the sanctioned and the imposing country. As Manuel Oechslin concluded in his study, “One 
of these observations is that targeted regimes hardly try to dampen the negative economic 
consequences; targeted regimes rather tend to respond by pursuing policies which severely 
compound the sanctions' adverse effects on the economy.”
25
 Basically, those in power are 
able to counter the impact of the sanctions by deflecting the impact onto their populations in 
a zero-sum effort to cover their losses at the people’s expense. Much research supports this 
conclusion according to Daniel Drezner, “Research emanating from wildly disparate 
theoretical and methodological perspectives came to the same conclusion about the effect of 






 The alternative of smart sanctions shows greater promise in 
satisfying the need to do something about belligerents in the international system without 
increasing the suffering of their citizens. Daniel Drezner explained the benefits well: “For 
recalcitrant members of the Security Council, smart sanctions offered the opportunity to 
cooperate with the hegemonic actor in the international system. At the same time, smart 
sanctions would not impose excessive humanitarian costs or threaten lucrative trading 
relationships with target countries.”
27
 These trading relationships are important channels of 
both money and ideas that greatly benefit the countries involved.  
 Trade relations are a critical tie that bind states in the international system. The 
improvement of U.S.-Sino relations after former President Nixon opened up diplomacy in the 
1970s is a stark reminder of the impact trade relations can have. Bruce Russett explained one 
of the harder to measure benefits of trade, “To the degree that trade benefits consumers and 
producers broadly throughout a society, its beneficiaries have a stake in the continuation of 
commerce and in the reliability of institutions that provide continuity.”
28
 Successful trade 
relations can greatly alter the relationship between states. China was turned from Cold War 
rival to one of the United States’ largest and most valuable trading partners. Iran and North 
Korea have the potential to be greatly altered through trade as well. Larry Diamond 
explained some of the vulnerabilities that authoritarians have to being connected to the 
international community through trade: “Linkages that render authoritarian states vulnerable 
to Western pressure include conventional economic ties (trade, investment, and credit), 
security ties (treaties and guarantees), and social ties (tourism, immigration, overseas 
education, elite exchanges, international NGO and church networks, and Western media 
penetration).”
29




and power, two things that trade can enhance. Iran seeks to be an active member of the 
international community and influential power within the Middle East. Its rulers are very 
likely to be open to trade. Bruce Russett explains some of the human rights benefits that can 
be accomplished through trade relations: “Preferential Trade Agreements often have human 
rights provisions. These agreements have been most effective in reducing violent repression 
when they incorporate ‘hard’ rather than ‘soft’ enforcement mechanisms (that is, the ability 
to terminate trade agreements and impose sanctions on repressive member states, rather than 
mere verbal standards that do not affect membership or market access).”
30
 Trade relations are 
one of the most powerful tools of diplomacy and the United States has the most powerful 
economy in the world. This asset should be used actively to engage countries throughout the 
world in a beneficial manner. Incorporating this into grand strategy would help focus efforts 
and reign in some of the negative impacts of non-governmental aid programs. Trade requires 
regulation and infrastructure, while aid is less beneficial.  
 Aid from both the government and non-governmental organizations is often 
counterproductive to the task of building state-capacity. Francis Fukuyama explains  “Those 
footing the bill for aid programs want to see the maximum number of patients treated and do 
not want their money to go to local bureaucrats, even if it is these bureaucrats who must 
provide health care services in the long run.”
31
 It is important to develop this state capacity in 
order for countries to have the foundation on which to build a democracy. According to 
Francis Fukuyama, “A good state institution is one that transparently and efficiently serves 
the needs of its clients--the citizens of the state.”
32
 It is a challenge to forge institutions where 
they do not have historical foundations. It is counterproductive to tear them down, even in 




United States should use its economic instrument of power to build trade relations that will 
facilitate infrastructure development that will become the pipelines for development. Francis 
Fukuyama made an important point to keep in mind: “Holding on to a certain structure of 
political power is often a life-and-death issue for leaders of poor countries, and no degree of 
external public-goods financing from the donor community will be sufficient to offset losses 
of power and prestige that will accompany true reform.”
33
 If the enemy is the Ayatollah and 
the Kim regime, then perhaps the better way to inspire their populations to depose them is by 
empowering them through trade rather than impoverishing them through sanctions and 
military threats. Authoritarians use negative actions by the United States to justify their own 
power and legitimacy. They thrive on the adversarial relationship with the United States. 
Take that away from them and they are left with few sources of legitimacy and their people 
will begin to question and challenge their power. It may be counterintuitive to open up 
relations with such anti-American governments as Iran and North Korea, but it is the best 
way to reform them. It takes power away from the belligerent authoritarian leaders and gives 
it to their people. As Fareed Zakaria stated, “As in the West, liberalization in East Asia has 
included economic liberalization, which is crucial in promoting both growth and liberal 
democracy.”
34
 Sanctions and military actions can be reserved as a last resort against a regime 
truly intent on attacking the United States, and can be targeted at offending regime members 
Military action can be reserved as a defensive measure until conflict is imminent. For the 
majority of the time, the United States should focus on constructive engagement, even with 
the most belligerent of regimes. Doing so will increase the chances of reform or internal 
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